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SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Robert E. Litts
Old Dominion University, 2021
Director: Dr. Dimitrie C. Popescu
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is used aboard the vast majority of sea-going
vessels in the world as a collision avoidance tool. Currently, the AIS operates without any
security features, which make it vulnerable to exploits such as spoofing, hijacking, and replay
attacks by malicious parties. This paper examines the work that has been done so far to
improve AIS security, as well as the approaches taken on similar problems in the aircraft
and vehicular mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) industries. The first major contribution of
this paper is the implementation of a Software Defined Radio (SDR) AIS transmitter and
receiver which can be used to conduct vulnerability analysis and test the implementation
of new security features. The second contribution is the design of a novel authentication
protocol which overcomes the existing vulnerabilities in the AIS system. The proposed
protocol uses time-delayed hash-chain key disclosures as part of a message authentication
code (MAC) appended to automatic position reports to verify the authenticity of a user.
This method requires only one additional time slot for broadcast authentication compared
to the existing standard and is a significant reduction in message overhead requirements
compared to alternative approaches that solely rely on public key infrastructure (PKI).
Additionally, there is an embedded time stamp, a feature lacking in the existing system,
which makes this protocol resistant to replay attacks. A test implementation of the proposed
protocol indicates that it can be deployed as a link layer software update to existing AIS
transceivers and can be deployed within the current AIS technical standards as an expanded
message set.
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In 1989, the tanker vessel Exxon Valdez spilled 11 million gallons of oil into Alaska’s
Prince William Sound, a disaster which cost over $7 billion to clean and severely disrupted
the local population for many decades. One result of this disaster was the 1990 Oil Pollution
Act (OPA) which required the U.S. Coast Guard to improve vessel tracking and monitoring
services within ports and harbors similar to aviation air traffic controllers [3]. Over the next
decade, the international community worked on various systems to meet such a need, and
ultimately the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and International Maritime
Organization (IMO) decided that a standardized protocol for international usage would be
a benefit to the maritime community [4]. In the late 1990s, the Automatic Identification
System (AIS) was created as a situational awareness and collision avoidance tool to provide
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) with improved clarity in harbors and improve navigational
safety onbord vessels operating in these often-chaotic sea lanes. However, this system was
created in a pre-9/11 world when cybersecurity was not a requirement, so the system oper-
ates freely within the maritime Very High Frequency (VHF) band [5]. AIS was created with
the assumption that all users would operate with respect and would not attempt to use this
tool for nefarious purposes. To that degree, the maritime community has been lucky. In the
early 2000s, AIS became mandatory onboard the vast majority of commercial vessels and
gave them a complete electronic picture of all surrounding vessels regardless of the weather,
sea state or visibility, which commonly cause RADAR deterioration. Today, the availability
of small, inexpensive AIS transceivers means that almost every vessel on the ocean operates
with AIS.
The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) agree-
ment formally dictates the type and size of vessels that are required to carry an operational
AIS system. The IMO adopted the SOLAS agreement following the sinking of the Titanic
in 1914 and has subsequently updated this international treaty as technology has expanded
in order to ensure widespread safety practices are being carried out on the high seas. SO-
LAS chapter V contains safety of navigation information and specifically lists requirements
for shipborne navigational systems and equipment. SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19.2.4
states that “All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages
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Fig. 1: Typical AIS Configuration aboard a vessel connected to electronic navigation equip-
ment
and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and
passenger ships irrespective of size shall be fitted with an automatic identification system
(AIS)” [6]. In the United States, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 33 §164.46
expands SOLAS V and requires additional vessels to carry AIS Class A/B devices within
U.S. waters. CFR 33 also requires vessels to accurately broadcast a properly assigned mar-
itime mobile service identity (MMSI) number and upkeep all AIS data fields and system
updates [7]. SOLAS Chapter V 18.9 requires an annual test by an approved surveyor or
testing facility that verifies the correct programming of static information and on-air RF
testing. Guidelines for this annual test are covered in the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee
(MSC) Circular 1252 [8]. Although there are no U.S. regulations that require a qualified
inspection of AIS in U.S. navigable waters, the U.S. Coast Guard publishes an AIS Inspec-
tion Checklist and Report that mirrors the IMO testing as well as a detailed AIS encoding
guide that walks vessel operators through the proper input of each AIS parameter [9, 10].
A typical AIS setup onboard a vessel would include connections to other navigation sensors
is shown in Fig. 1.
The VHF antenna allows the AIS transceiver to send/receive AIS messages to other
vessels. Dynamic information about a vessel is automatically input from the ship’s GPS
which provides position, course, and speed data. This information is then fed into the
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ships electronic chart display information system (ECDIS) which can overlay AIS and radar
information on a navigation chart to improve situational awareness. It is important to
note that although dynamic positional data is directly fed from the GPS unit, static AIS
information must be manually set up and maintained by the vessel operators.
1.1 AIS SECURITY
Neither the ITU M.1371-5 nor the IMO SOLAS standards implicitly include message
confidentiality, integrity, or authentication of participating users; therefore, AIS lacks some
of the fundamental principles of a secure network. Just as the early days of the internet
assumed all users would act with good intentions, AIS was initially created with those same
hopes. The U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center (NAVCEN) frequently asked questions
page states that “AIS by design, is an open, non-proprietary, unencrypted, unprotected
radio system, intended to operate on non-secure VHF-FM channels. So technically it can
be spoofed - so trust, but, verify” and directs users to submit a problem report if they
encounter AIS related errors [11, 12]. Additionally, the USCG maintains a Vessel Infor-
mation Verification Service which is a website where you can find AIS static information
discrepancies for vessels within the Nationwide AIS (NAIS) coverage [13]. Once again, the
AIS system relies on the good faith of system users and vessel operators to manually input
and verify that their data matches that on file with applicable governing agencies. This
showcases the first major vulnerability of AIS, which is that users are inherently trusted
to properly maintain their vessel’s information which is broadcast without interruption to
all surrounding stations within range. Even the presence of completely false data must be
manually verified by an end-user using a website to submit a report. A recent collision
between two towing vessels improperly displaying their static AIS data on the Mississippi
River prompted the USCG to release a Marine Safety Alert titled “AIS – Accurate Broad-
casts Don’t Happen Automatically [14]”. Since this collision involved the improper setting
of the vessel’s length between two vessels around a blind bend (i.e. initially not in visual
sight of one another), other AIS system users should have been able to alert that the vessel
was improperly displaying its AIS information and should remain clear. Therefore, relying
solely on one vessel to determine its own information provides a single source of failure.
Due to its insecure design, AIS contains well-documented vulnerabilities that can easily
be exploited by an adversary armed with a simple software-defined radio (SDR) and a VHF
antenna and that could potentially cripple a major harbor. The vulnerabilities in the AIS
system are a reflection of the time period in which it was created, and nearly two decades
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later we must implement solutions that adhere to the original design of the system as a
public, navigation safety tool while ensuring bad actors cannot use this same data to cause
harm to people or property. In 2018, members from the U.S. Coast Guard Research and
Development Center (RDC), some of whom were involved in the initial creation of AIS in the
nineties, stated that we must begin an international discussion of the requirements of “AIS
2.0” which should take into consideration national cybersecurity objectives [5]. Several other
authors have researched AIS vulnerabilities and have suggested or developed solutions that
would provide authentication and encryption to the entire AIS system. Additionally, sev-
eral commercial and government products provide encrypted AIS transmissions for smaller
subsets of vessels for use in law enforcement and other fleet activities where confidentiality
is required. However, the void still remains for a secure public AIS system. The complete
lack of security in the original design of AIS means that vessel data can be spoofed and
hijacked. Additionally, AIS messages lack a time stamp and are therefore vulnerable to
replay attacks. A bad actor can simply record a series of legitimate AIS transmissions from
a vessel and replay them at any given time to create a fictitious target with real data. There
is also no message integrity, meaning that there is no way to know if the data you received
actually matches the data that was sent.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The presence of these vulnerabilities within the decades old AIS system provide the
motivation for this thesis. The goal of my research is to evaluate a feasible method to bring
AIS up to the twenty-first century cybersecurity standards and eliminate the cause of two
major AIS vulnerabilities: lack of source authentication and lack of message integrity. The
major contributions I provide from this paper are twofold. First, I have built a Software
Defined Radio (SDR) implementation of AIS which provides a robust test platform for
system analysis. Second, I provide the details of a novel authentication protocol for securing
AIS, based on the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol
which enables receivers of multicast communications to authenticate the source and integrity
of received data packets. Unlike the alternative approaches proposed for authentication in
AIS, the approach presented here can authenticate messages without the use of an a priori
shared secret key or the need to conduct key exchanges over several messages and requires
significantly less overhead. This authentication protocol secures AIS by providing source
authentication, ensures message integrity, and includes an explicit time stamp within data
messages to prevent replay attacks.
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1.3 THESIS OUTLINE
I will now provide a road map for the remaining sections of this thesis. Chapter 2
will cover the background information that is vital to analysis of AIS security. This will
include a comprehensive review of the AIS system, including a technical overview using the
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. I will also review the fundamental elements of
cryptography which must be understood before delving into the implementation of a security
protocol for AIS. This chapter will conclude with a more detailed discussion of the existing
vulnerabilities in the AIS system. Chapter 3 provides a review of the existing research
that has been done on AIS security as well as an examination of research that is being
done on similar problems in the aviation industry’s Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) system and Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET), which include block
chain and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) web-of-trust technology. Chapter 4 covers my first
major contribution which is the implementation of an SDR AIS transmitter and receiver.
Chapter 5 covers my second major contribution, namely the details of a novel authentication
protocol for securing AIS, based on the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication
(TESLA) protocol. The work in Chapters 4 and 5 will be presented at the 2021 IEEE
International Black Sea Conference on Communications and Networking. Finally, Chapter




This chapter will begin by providing a technical overview of the AIS using the OSI model
and a breakdown of the Maritime Mobile Service Identifier (MMSI) used to uniquely identify
every vessel. Next, there will be a brief overview of cryptography principles. Finally, a more
detailed discussion of existing AIS vulnerabilities will be provided.
2.1 AIS TECHNICAL INFORMATION
AIS over-the-air transmissions are standardized by ITU M.1371-5 as a response to the
IMO requirement for a universal shipborne AIS system to provide efficient communica-
tion between ships and shore stations. Internally, National Marine Electronics Association
(NMEA) 0183 proprietary standard is used for data transmission between AIS and other
electronic navigation systems at 4,800 baud [15]. Class A shipborne AIS systems comply
with the IMO AIS carriage requirements while Class B devices are not necessarily in full
compliance. Access to the VHF data link (VDL) should be accommodated through time di-
vision multiple access (TDMA) [1]. Self-organized time division multiple access (SOTDMA)
is the preferred TDMA scheme for Class A devices since it appropriately accommodates users
and makes efficient use of the radio spectrum. While many Class B devices use SOTDMA,
some use carrier-sense TDMA (CSTDMA) which ensures the device only transmits when
the network is free and does not interfere with SOTDMA Class A or B devices. Additional
access schemes used by AIS will be discussed in Section 2.2.2. The system is designed to
be autonomous, automatic, continuous and operate primarily in broadcast mode, although
interrogation is possible [1]. Finally, AIS should be capable of expanding to accommodate
future regulations which require more vessels to use the system. In general, AIS is a system
which automatically and continually broadcasts a ship’s dynamic and static information to
all other stations in range and can receive and process the same information from others in a
self-organized manner. Additionally, AIS is capable of transmitting safety related messages
on request [1].
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Fig. 2: Reporting Rate for Class A Device [1]
2.1.1 TRANSMISSION SCHEDULE
AIS will transmit a ship’s static information (such as name, MMSI, call-sign, length)
every six minutes, when data has been changed, or upon request. Dynamic information such
as course and speed are much more pertinent to other vessels and thus this information is
updated at a more frequent interval. The Reporting Rate (RR) for dynamic information is
set at a variable rate based on a ship’s navigation status, speed, and course. This means
that if a vessel’s status is listed as moored (not moving; attached to a dock or buoy) or
at anchor (not moving; attached to the ocean floor), the AIS system will report at a less
frequent interval than if the ship is listed as underway (moving). AIS is interfaced with the
ship’s global positioning system (GPS) which provides course over ground (COG) and speed
over ground (SOG) data which are used to formulate the AIS reporting decisions. Fig. 2
shows the dynamic reporting conditions for a Class A AIS device.
Similarly, Class B devices have incremental reporting intervals based on speed, but they
occur less frequently. Aids to navigation and AIS base stations also report at a set interval
of 3 minutes and 10 seconds respectively.
2.2 ANALYSIS OF AIS USING OSI MODEL
In order to understand the AIS system design more clearly, I will conduct an analysis
using the OSI model. AIS layers 1-4 and their general purpose are shown in Fig 3.
8
Fig. 3: Layers 1-4 of AIS using OSI Model
2.2.1 PHYSICAL LAYER
AIS operates in the VHF maritime mobile band within the frequency range 156.025-
162.025MHz. There are two primary channels, both with a bandwidth of 25kHz: 161.975MHz
(AIS 1, default channel 1, 2087) and 162.025MHz (AIS 2, default channel 2, 2088). Addi-
tionally, maritime channels 75 and 76 are designated for long-range AIS usage with satellites.
AIS encodes data at the physical layer using non-return to zero inverted (NRZI) encoding
(change in level when a 0 occurs in bit stream) and Gaussian-filtered minimum shift keying
(GMSK) modulation with a maximum time-bandwidth product of 0.4 at the transmitter
and 0.5 at the receiver. The bit rate of the data should be 9,600 bit/s +/- 50ppm.
NRZI
This is a binary line code used for transmitting a binary signal to a physical signal, and
in the case of AIS is used to transition binary data for transmission over the VHF channel.
Data bits are denoted using the presence or absence of transition at a clock boundary. AIS
denotes a transition as a 0, meaning that the presence of a clock transition denotes a 0 while
the absence of a clock transition denotes a 1. Fig. 4 shows an example of NRZI with a
transition associated with the symbol “0”.
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Fig. 4: NRZI Line Coding, Transition on 0
GMSK
This modulation scheme is used to transmit the NRZI line code over the VHF channel
by varying the phase of the signal. GMSK is a form of MSK that applies a Gaussian filter
before the signal is modulated. MSK uses a frequency separation of (f2−f1) = Tb2 , where Tb
is the bit period, and represents the minimum separation required for orthogonality using
coherent detection and thus why the term “minimum” is used for this modulation scheme.
MSK is a form of binary continuous phase frequency shift keying (CPFSK) which means
that phase shifts are not as abrupt as they are in traditional FSK, which uses shifts in
frequency to encode data and consequently results in drastic phase shifts. Fig. 5 shows a
comparison between the phases of MSK and FSK transmission of a binary input.
These abrupt phase shifts in FSK are generated because the transmitter resets the fre-
quency between each symbol, whereas a continuous phase modulation scheme has memory
which allows phase transitions to occur based on the previously transmitted signal. A block
diagram of the GMSK transmitter is shown in Fig. 6.
While Fig. 5 shows the difference between continuous and non-continuous phase modula-
tion, GMSK provides the additional benefit of further smoothing phase transitions through
pulse shaping prior to transmission. This can be seen in Fig. 7.
The discontinuities in phase jumps for a non-continuous phase modulation scheme such as
FSK means that spectral efficiency is diminished, and therefore smoothing phase transitions
through Gaussian filtering allows signals to be transmitted in band limited channels with
greater ease. The effect on the spectrum can be seen through analysis of the power spectral
density (PSD) of various modulation schemes. Fig. 8 shows a comparison of the PSD of
MSK and Offset Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (OQPSK).
MSK falls in power much faster than OQPSK meaning it is more spectrally efficient.
Since GMSK is pulse shaped using a Gaussian filter, sideband power is further reduced from
regular MSK making it even more spectrally efficient and ideal for use in the maritime VHF
spectrum [16]. Additionally, GMSK uses a constant envelope which makes demodulation of
10






















Fig. 5: Phase difference between CPFSK and FSK
Fig. 6: GMSK Transmitter Block Diagram
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Fig. 7: Phase difference between MSK and GMSK
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Fig. 8: PSD Comparison between OQPSK, MSK, QPSK, GMSK
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Fig. 9: BT Comparison for GMSK Signal
the signal fairly straightforward [17]. The time bandwidth (BT ) product is used to further
define the GMSK signal and is used to control the effects of the Gaussian filter. T represents
the symbol period and B represents the 3dB (half-power) bandwidth, so the effect of the
BT is to compress the signal within a smaller bandwidth space. Fig 9. shows a comparison
of BT values for a GMSK signal with values ranging from .1-1.
The lower the BT value, the more spectrally efficient the signal is, but there is also
a greater chance of inter-symbol interference (ISI) since the constellation points are closer
together and thus the receiver will have a more difficult time correctly identifying symbols.
For the AIS system, a BT between .4− .5 is used which provides a good trade-off between
detection at the receiver and bandwidth efficiency.
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2.2.2 LINK LAYER
Data from the VHF channel is accessed using TDMA with a common time reference syn-
chronized every 2 seconds for a mobile user and every 3.33 seconds for a base station. Users
either have direct access to coordinated universal time (UTC) by setting a synchronization
state to UTC direct, while other stations who cannot should synchronize their time off of
nearby stations with the proper synchronization state set. Users cannot achieve indirect
synchronization more than one user removed from UTC direct to avoid timing errors.
Frame
Data frames are one minute blocks of time divided into 2, 250 slots (indexed 0 − 2249)
with default access at the start of a frame. Frames are coordinated with UTC to start/stop
with each UTC minute. This means that each slot is allocated 26.667ms for transmission.
Users may begin transmitting Radio Frequency (RF) power at the start of a slot and must
conclude within the allocated slots for transmission. Slots can be:
 Free - unused within receiving range
 Internal Allocation - allocated for transmission by own station; can be used for trans-
mission
 External Allocation – allocated for transmission by another station
 Available - externally allocated by another station and is possible for reuse
 Unavailable – externally allocated by another station and cannot be a candidate for
reuse
Data is transferred using high-level data link control (HDLC) specified by ISO/IEC 13229:2002
which includes a start and stop flag to indicate the presence of a data packet, and addition-
ally includes a training sequence to synchronize the VHF receiver.
Data Packet Format
AIS data is transmitted in a packet consisting of 256 bits using the format shown in Fig.
10.
 Ramp up: Used between start of RF power and 80% RF power
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Fig. 10: AIS Data Packet, Adapted from [1]
 Training Sequence: Sequence of alternating 0’s and 1’s and may begin with either a 0
or 1 since NRZI is used
 Start Flag: Standard HDLC flag used to detect the start of a transmission packet, set
as 01111110 and is not subject to bit stuffing.
 Data: Contains the message being sent
 Frame Check Sequence (FCS): Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) to calculate checksum
of data
 End Flag: Identical to the start flag
 Buffer: Allows for differentiation between messages from delay, sub-divided into the
following:
Bit stuffing – 4 bits
Distance delay – 14 bits correcting for propagation delay of over 120NM (maximum
possible is 235.9 nautical miles)
Synchronization jitter – 6 bits used to preserve integrity of TDMA
Bit stuffing is utilized for data and the frame check sequence (FCS), which means that
at the transmitter five consecutive ones should then have a zero inserted, while the receiver
should remove the first zero after five consecutive ones.
A training sequence consisting of 24 bits alternating 0 and 1 is sent to synchronize with
the receiver. Following the training sequence, the start flag is sent which is 8 bits and is
defined as:
Start Flag: 011111110
Following 168 bits of data is a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) checksum based on the
data portion of the frame to ensure the integrity of the data frame. Finally, the packet
concludes with an end flag of identical construction to the start flag.
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As stated previously, the 24 bit buffer space is used to account for differences in message
lengths based on transmission effects and ensures messages are not transmitting over one
another. Stations are allowed to occupy a maximum of 5 consecutive slots for continuous
transmission and are only required to send a single set of overhead messages surrounding
the data at the beginning/end of the transmission.
Access to Data Link
SOTDMA is the primary access scheme for the AIS system and is used mainly for
repetitive messages on a scheduled interval from an autonomous station. There are three
additional schemes for controlling data transfer when non-repetitive messages are required
and when reporting intervals are changed. These access schemes are incremental time divi-
sion multiple access (ITDMA), random access TDMA (RATDMA), and fixed access TDMA
(FATDMA).
Upon entry into the network, the AIS device will monitor the VHF data link for 1 minute
to determine a dynamic directory of all members and generate a frame map of the TDMA
activity. After this initial elapsed time period, a user will enter the network entry phase
where they wait for a nominal transmission slot (NTS) which is randomly selected among
potential candidate slots within the selection interval using ITDMA to pre-designate a slot.
Upon reaching the NTS, the user (if Class A mobile) will transmit a special position report
(type 3) and then select its next NTS using the SOTDMA access scheme within the selection
interval.
All messages contain a message ID within the data portion of the packet from Fig.
10, but the access scheme determines the remainder of the data structure. When using
SOTDMA, the data portion of the packet is formulated as shown in Fig. 11 while ITDMA
is formulated as shown in Fig. 12.
17
Fig. 11: SOTDMA Data Structure, Adapted from [1]
Fig. 12: ITDMA Data Structure, Adapted from [1]
2.2.3 NETWORK LAYER
The purpose of the network layer is to ensure messages are delivered in priority order,
handle congestion resolution, and ensure messages are coordinated between the four possible
AIS channels. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, AIS channel 1/2 are for ship-to-ship VHF AIS
messages while channels 75 and 76 are reserved for long range satellite applications (Message
27). AIS is set to operate by receiving AIS channel 1/2 in parallel and transmit both
periodic and non-periodic messages by alternating between channels every other message.
For example, if initial link access and the first broadcast position report is sent on AIS
channel 1, then the next periodic broadcast report will be sent on AIS channel 2. Responses
to addressed messages should be conducted on the same frequency on which it was sent.
AIS messages also contain four different priorities which aid in congestion control should
messages require queuing. These priorities rank safety of navigation messages as the highest,
while general information messages are lower.
 Priority 1: Position reports and link viability messages
18
 Priority 2: Safety related messages
 Priority 3: Assignment and interrogation messages
 Priority 4: All other messages
As Priority 1 messages deal with position reports and navigation safety, changes in RR
resulting from a vessel altering its course, speed, or status may increase or decrease the
number of these messages present in the link. Fig. 2 from Section 2.1.1 shows the dynamic
schedule of possible RR based on vessel information. If a vessel increases its speed to a
threshold that requires a change in RR, then the link layer ITDMA algorithm should be
followed to identify a new NTS and then report at the new rate. Faster speeds mean vessels
have less time to react, so it is of the utmost priority that these new messages are given
access to the link. However, when a vessel decreases speed to a level that necessitates a
new RR, the change should only occur after three minutes have elapsed at this new slower
speed. This means that the AIS system leans on the side of caution and would rather have
a slower unit reporting more rapidly than inadvertently miss a critical position report of
a fast moving vessel. For course changes, a vessel’s mean heading over the previous 30
second interval is compared to the present heading. Based on this information, a vessel is
determined to be “changing course” if a heading change of greater than 5◦ is detected, and
should be maintained until the change is less than 5◦ for 20 seconds. If the link becomes
congested and therefore priority 1 messages may be in jeopardy of transmission, slots should
be intentionally reused from distance stations (> 120nm) in order to ensure that there are at
least 4 candidate slots available for transmission. This ensures that the SOTDMA random
selection of a transmission slot has at least 4 slots for use.
2.2.4 TRANSPORT LAYER
The final layer discussed here is the transport layer which ensures packets are appro-
priately sized and sequenced and should be the interface between the presentation layer.
This layer has the important function of ensuring data packets are formatted properly so
that they can be properly handled by other applications. For example, if a message requires
too much data and exceeds the allowable number of slots for AIS transmission, it should
reject the packet at the presentation layer. Additionally, this layer should correctly handle
responses for addressed messages (Type 6/12) as well as ensuring broadcast messages are
not acknowledged.
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2.3 AIS MESSAGE TYPES
There are 63 possible AIS message types, with only message types 1-27 currently in
use. These message types range from simple position reports, which provide an update to
a vessel’s GPS location, to aids-to-navigation reports that update the position of a buoy or
navigation marker. A full list of these messages, along with their applicable priority, access
schemes, and communication state can be found in [1].
2.4 MARITIME MOBILE SERVICE IDENTIFIER
The MMSI number is a unique nine-digit number issued to a vessel and is formatted as
shown in Eq. 1. ITU-R M.585-8 standardizes the assignment and use of MMSI numbers
throughout the world [18].
M1I2D3X4X5X6X7X8X9 (1)
The first three digits are the maritime identification digits (MID) and represents the
country having jurisdiction over the vessel (the vessel’s flag state). MID’s are also assigned
by the ITU and allow expansion if a country exceeds the number of unique six digit numbers
following the MID. The U.S. has several MIDs including 338 and 366-369 [19]. The remaining
digits X1 −X9 are a unique 9 digit identifier for the vessel.
MMSI numbers can also assigned to aids-to-navigation (ATON) such as buoys or light-




Aircraft can also be assigned MMSI numbers using the prefix 111. Search and rescue
transponders (SART), man-overboard (MOB) and AIS-equipped emergency positioning in-
dicating radio beacon (EPIRB) are considered emergency life-saving equipment and must
have MMSI numbers assigned for identification of the owner of that specific device. These
MMSI numbers are formatted as shown in Eq 2.
917203X4X5Y6Y7Y8Y9 (2)
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X4−X5 are the manufacturer ID, 01−99, and Y6−Y9 are sequence numbers 0000−9999.
Similarly, Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 show the format for a MOB indicator and EPIRB device




The idea of secure communication predates wired and wireless communication and ad-
dresses the fundamental idea that most people or organizations are looking for when sending
or receiving a message: how do I know what I received is unaltered, comes from who I expect,
and is not viewed by anyone else? These questions can be briefly defined as the fundamental
tenants of information security:
 Confidentiality – Only the sender and intended receiver should be able to understand
the contents of the transmitted message, often referred to as encrypted or secure
communications
 Integrity - Ensuring the contents of a message is unaltered
 Authentication – Confirming the sender and receiver are who they claim to be
The AIS system contains a simple CRC which only ensures there are no bit transmission
errors; there is no confidentiality, integrity, or authentication. As discussed in section 2.6, the
system has many holes which could benefit from the application of basic security principles.
One of the simplest methods of providing encryption is to take a plain text message and
apply a key, KA, to the message which encodes the data using an algorithm. Now the text
is unreadable to a human and requires a key to undo the encryption of the message and
read its contents. Based on this principle, several encryption methods exist [20].
2.5.1 SYMMETRIC (SECRET) KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
In symmetric key cryptography, the same key (called a key pair) is used for both encryp-
tion and decryption. In this example, m is the plain-text contents of a message and KA is
an encryption key used by “Alice” to seal the contents of the message so that nobody else
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can read it. However, if Alice gives this key to her friend “Bob”, he can use KA to decrypt
the message. This means that the following equation holds true:
m = KA[KA(m)]. (5)
This form of encryption is one of the oldest, most classical ways of conducting secure
communications between users. However, the issue here lies in the fact that the secret
key must remain secret, which itself requires a secure method of transmitting the key.
Without knowing the secret key, you would be unable to read an encrypted message, yet
you cannot encrypt a message without knowing a secret key, so therein lies a conundrum.
Users can physically exchange keys, but this limits the scope of the encryption mechanism
and if the key is somehow compromised, then all messages between the users could easily be
intercepted, viewed and altered. Additionally, symmetric key cryptography does not provide
authentication since keys are identical and must be shared. One method of symmetric key
cryptography currently in use is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) which uses 128,
192, or 256 bit keys and has been proven to be resistant to brute force attacks [20].
2.5.2 ASYMMETRIC (PUBLIC) KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be created to eliminate the need to share a
secret key as seen in the symmetric key scenario. Instead, Alice and Bob can communicate
with their own private key (known only to themselves) and share a public key (known to
everyone). In order to be sure the public key is valid, it is signed by a Certificate Authority
(CA) which holds the sole job of validating and issuing certificates that bind the key with
the identity. This CA role can be managed in a variety of ways but should be a highly
trusted third party (TTP) contact for validation of public keys. If the CA is untrustworthy
or becomes compromised, the validity of every user in the PKI structure comes into question
which makes this a significant point of failure [20].
In this scenario, the keys will be denoted as follows:
Alice’s Private Key: K−A
Alice’s Public Key: K+A
Bob’s Private Key: K−B
Bob’s Public Key: K+B
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Using these four keys, Alice and Bob can exchange a plaintext message without the need
to exchange a secret key. This occurs because the key pairs are generated in such a manner
that one of the keys is the only possible method to decode a message encrypted with the
other. This means that the following equations hold true:
m = K−A [K
+





m = K−B [K
+





These types of public/private key pairs can be generated using the Rivest, Shamir,
Adelson (RSA) algorithm which uses the following steps:
 Select two large prime numbers, p, q
 n = pq, z = (p− 1) ∗ (q − 1)
 Select e < n, such that e has no common factors with z
 Select d such that ed ∗mod(z) = 1
 Public Key: (n, e)
 Private Key: (n, d)
To encrypt a message m, compute the following:
c = me ∗mod(n) (8)
To decrypt a message, c, compute the following:
m = cd ∗mod(n) (9)
The fact that either the public or private key can decrypt the other as shown in Eq. 6
and Eq. 7 can be proven using Eq. 9 and modular math properties.
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cd ∗mod(n) = m
c = me ∗mod(n)
n = pq
z = (p− 1) ∗ (q − 1)
cd ∗mod(n) = (me ∗mod(n))d ∗mod(n)
cd ∗mod(n) = me∗d ∗mod(n)
(me ∗mod(n))d ∗mod(n) = me∗d ∗mod(n)
(me ∗mod(n))d ∗mod(n) = (md ∗mod(n))e ∗mod(n)
Therefore, if Alice wants to send a message to Bob that only he can read, she can encrypt
the message using his public key, and as long as his private key remains known only to him,
Bob will be the only one who will be able to decrypt the message as shown in Eq. 7.
Using a similar principle, Alice and Bob can use these four keys to create a digital
signature by reversing the order in which the keys are used. Instead of using Bob’s public
key to encrypt a message, she can encrypt a message using her own private key (known
only to her) and when Bob receives the encrypted message, he can use Alice’s public key
to decrypt the message which shows that only Alice could have sent the message. However,
this does not provide confidentiality since Alice’s public key is known to everyone.
One potential issue that arises with PKI is that digital signatures using public key en-
cryption mechanisms require 3-5 orders of magnitude more processing power than symmetric
key cryptography. To reduce the size of a message’s contents, a hashed message authen-
tication code (HMAC) can be used. First, the entire message and a secret key are sent
through a hash function, which essentially provides a one-way, fixed size fingerprint of the
message that cannot be reversed. The HMAC is then sent as an attachment to the original
plain text message. The receiver will then compute the hash of the plain text message along
with the secret key and compare this to the HMAC that was sent. If they are identical,
the receiver can be assured the message is authentic and has not been changed in transit.
However, the HMAC must necessarily include an initial, lengthy symmetric key exchange
using PKI to ensure that only the sender and receiver have access to the key used in the
HMAC; otherwise, there would be no way to verify the authenticity of the sender. There-
fore, the HMAC reduces the computation and overhead of individual messages, but requires
a several-message exchange with each user at the beginning of a transmission in order to
agree upon a key.
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2.5.3 IDENTITY BASED ENCRYPTION
In 1985, Adi Shamir built upon the generic public key cryptography scheme and proposed
a methodology called Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) which removes the need to store
and retrieve another user’s public key from a database or repository [21]. In his system, he
proposed that individuals are given a smart-card by a trusted key generation center. The
card contains their private key as well as the ability to decrypt all other user’s public keys.
The novel concept here is that the other users’ public keys are generated based on other
publicly available, unique information such as a name or e-mail address. This means that
users only have one interaction with the trusted third party to obtain their smart card and
no longer have to conduct frequent exchanges to verify the public key of every user. The
obvious issue in this implementation is that the trusted third party contains the mechanism
to generate private keys for every individual and thus those secrets must be closely guarded.
If compromised, all users in the system will need to be re-issued new keys. Additionally,
the RSA scheme discussed earlier is unable to meet the requirements of this system due to
the fact that a seed value must be able to generate private keys for all users and that same
seed value must not be computable from the public/private keys. In Shamir’s proposal, the
signature can be generated using the following equation:
se = i ∗ tf(t,m) ∗mod(n) (10)
The function f is chosen by the trusted third party as well as common values of n and
e, but the trusted third party is the only one who knows the factorization of n. The user’s
identity, i, is unique and public, and the private key generated by the trusted third party
takes the form:
ge = i ∗mod(n) (11)
A user can sign a message using the equation:
t = re ∗mod(n) (12)
And verification is conducted using:
s = g ∗ rf(t,m) ∗mod(n) (13)
Shamir recommended extending each user’s identity into a pseudo-random string in order
to improve security and reduce relationships between identities. This would not change
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the identity basis of the scheme since all users would know the pseudo-random generation
function and be able to compute the pseudo-random string of any other user’s identity.
While Shamir’s scheme does not eliminate the need for a trusted third party altogether, it
does alleviate some of the burden associated with public key exchanges while maintaining
authentication.
2.5.4 BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
In recent years, the blockchain has become a prominent feature within the financial com-
munity to provide anonymous exchange of digital currency, but its benefits have extended
into many communities. Many researchers are working to adapt this technology and apply
it to their fields, including secure communications. NASA has recently looked into applying
a blockchain-based protocol based on IBM’s Hyperledger fabric to overhaul ADS-B secu-
rity, so there is potential that a similar approach can be used for AIS [22]. The original
idea for the blockchain was published by Satoshi Nakamoto in [2] and contained the basis
for a peer-to-peer electronic cash system that eliminated the need for a third party finan-
cial institution. Instead, Nakamoto conceptualized a hash-based proof-of-work to create an
immutable record of all previous transactions so long as the collective CPU power of the
honest users is greater than that of would-be attackers. In this paper, the goal is to figure
out a way to prevent “double-spending” which requires knowledge of previous transactions
and balances. This is traditionally accomplished through the use of a trusted-third-party
(TTP) who receives and validates every transaction. Eliminating this TTP means that
every node needs to have knowledge of every previous transaction. Essentially, there needs
to be a mechanism for all nodes in the network to collectively agree upon one common
history of transactions. The first step to achieving such a mechanism is the creation of a
time stamp server that can prove data existed at the time stated by creating a time-value
hash chain. Next, a proof-of-work (POW) is required to implement this time stamp server
within the network. The POW is a complex computation involving an incremental nonce
that requires exponentially more CPU power for each instance generated. The result of the
POW is a value that can be used in a chain to provide a record of all previous work, and any
changes would require redoing each computation. This POW also allows for a fair decision
making process and includes a time-based mechanism to slow down calculations if they are
being computed too quickly which could lead to vulnerabilities. Within this framework, all
transactions are broadcast and stored as blocks, where the longest chain is considered to be
the correct object. To save space, Merkle Trees are used for storage which means only the
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Fig. 13: Binary Merkle Tree Example, Derived from [2]
root must be included in the hash function and branches can be pruned. A Merkle Tree
is a method to simplify the storage of hash functions by concatenating a number of child
nodes into parent nodes as successive branches of a tree, ultimately resulting in a root node
derived from all nodes beneath it. An example of a binary Merkle Tree can be seen in Fig.
13.
From Fig. 13, Hash0 is created by taking the hash of Tx0 and Hash1 is created by taking
the hash of Tx1. Hash0 and Hash1 are then concatenated, and then the hash of that is
taken to produce Hash01. Moving up the tree, if any given user can verify the root hash
is valid, it proves that all children nodes produced from this root are also valid. In Bitcoin
and other blockchain based payment systems, users only need to keep block headers (which
contain the Merkle root) for the longest existing POW chain, and the accuracy lies in the
fact that it is a valid part of the blockchain.
Since blocks are generated using complex computations, there is a possibility that an
attacker generates the next block in the chain. However, since the blocks are built upon
one another, this would also require the attacker to derive each previous block in the chain;
thus, the problem becomes exceedingly complex as the length of the blockchain increases.
Assuming the attacker starts from behind, the probability to catchup, qz, can be calculated
as follows, where q is the probability the attacker finds the next block, p is the probability
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You can see that as z gets larger, the probability that the attacker will ever catch up grows
exponentially smaller. Therefore, once the blockchain is initiated, every successful addition
makes it increasingly more secure thus creating an immutable chain that can maintain a
public record of secure transactions from numerous users.
There is potential to use a blockchain based system to conduct secure maritime commu-
nications or conduct PKI exchanges in order to eliminate the need for a CA.
2.5.5 PGP WEB OF TRUST
PGP was developed by Phillip Zimmerman in the early 1990s during a time when e-mail
was just beginning to come online. He wanted to develop a system that “...empowers people
to take privacy into their own hands” instead of relying on government controlled encryption
protocols [23]. The foundation of PGP is a traditional PKI system where users generate
public and private keys used for encryption and digital signatures as described in Section
2.5.2. However, Zimmerman delves into the methodology for how “trust” in a public key is
established. He raises the dilemma where a user wants to send an encrypted message to Alice
and retrieves her public key from a database, but unbeknownst to the sender, this public
key actually belongs to Charlie who has generated a public key with Alice’s identity. When
the user uses this public key to encrypt a message, Charlie will actually receive the message
and read its contents, not Alice. Typical PKI structures use a TTP to sign public keys and
bind them to a specific user to prevent this problem from occurring. PGP expands upon
this notion and allows individual users to sign public keys by incorporating the notion of an
“introducer” who signs a copy of Alice’s public key, essentially vouching for its authenticity.
For example, if you know David is a trustworthy source, and if David has signed Alice’s
public key, you can verify David’s signature on Alice’s key and be assured the key actually
belongs to Alice.
The author notes that protecting public keys and ensuring they are associated with the
correct individual is the most difficult problem in PKI but believes that the social dynamic
of individuals interacting and signing each other’s keys is the natural way to handle this
dilemma. As individuals sign public keys and post them to a centralized database, a web of
trust is formed where links in the web are established via trust sources that exist between
individuals. As this web grows larger, one will inevitably find a path to establish a trust
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Fig. 14: PGP trust model of public key verification using introductions
link between themselves and another individual so that minimal introductions are needed.
It is also important to distinguish between trust in the integrity of who the source claims to
be, and trust in the individual. For example, just because David trusts that Alice’s public
key belongs to her does not mean that David trusts Alice as an individual; David simply
knows with certainty that her public key is verifiable. Users in PGP can also choose who
they want to trust. There is no requirement that one must accept a key through an existing
trust relationship. For example, just because Bob trusts David and David trusts Alice, Bob
does not necessarily have to trust keys from Alice. In [24], a novel upgrade to PGP was
proposed that added in a feedback element where a user can negatively sign a public key,
essentially stating that they do not believe the public key belongs to who it claims. Their
evaluations showed that even with untrustworthy or malicious users, their model of trust
allowed for better coverage and accuracy of the web of trust when extended to many users.
Ultimately, PGP provides an alternative approach to the handling of public key signatures
than the traditional root CA.
2.6 AIS VULNERABILITIES
Chapter 1 introduced the fact that AIS was designed as an inherently insecure system.
To specifically address the ways in which these vulnerabilities can be exploited, the authors
in [25] pointed out the following security issues within the AIS system:
1. Ship spoofing – Assigning static and dynamic AIS information to a fake ship and
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planting that vessel in any location in the world.
2. ATON Spoofing – Similar to ship spoofing, this attack involves creating a fake ATON
beacon and placing it in a false location within harbors to direct vessels into danger
3. Collision Spoofing – Since AIS was created to reduce risk of collision, this feature can
set off alarms using their first identified threat (ship spoofing) by placing a fictitious
vessel on a collision course with another real vessel.
4. AIS-SART Spoofing – Similar to ship spoofing, this attack includes creating a fake
AIS-SART beacon that would lure rescue forces into a specific area in order to assist
with the distress.
5. Weather Forecasting – Using binary messages to convey false weather alerts.
6. AIS Hijacking – Modifying a real user’s AIS static or dynamic information to falsify
the vessel’s location, name, speed, or flag state.
7. Availability Disruption – Impersonating maritime authority using existing AIS mes-
sages to disable all AIS communications within a large geographic area.
8. Frequency Hopping - Impersonating a maritime authority to force users to change
their AIS frequency, rendering the system useless since the user will have nobody to
transmit/receive information with. AIS is designed to have such a command persist
even after a reboot.
9. Timing Attack – An AIS transponder is instructed to delay its transmission or transmit
at an extremely fast pace and overload the SOTDMA process of AIS messages amongst
users.
2.6.1 AIS MESSAGE 21: AID-TO-NAVIGATION (ATON) REPORT
This message is sent out to provide the position and status of ATON but due to the
lack of AIS authentication can be manipulated or falsified. Although physical ATON still
exist in harbors to guide ships into and out of port, electronic ATON can be implemented
by a competent authority to mark the virtual position of where an ATON should be located
if it was either moved off station due to weather or damage. While this technology is
greatly beneficial to mariners and the USCG alike, the potential for harm is possible. In
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shallow water ports with narrow channels such as the Chesapeake Bay’s Thimble Shoals
channel, an adversary would simply need to relocate electronic AIS beacons a few hundred
feet north or south, which would potentially lead mariners to falsely believe they are out
of the channel and potentially run aground. Aside from the environmental and logistical
challenges associated with such a disaster in a narrow channel, this could also lead to other
defense and homeland security related issues since a major U.S. Navy maritime port with
numerous nuclear-powered vessels is now blocked for entrance/exit.
2.6.2 AIS MESSAGE 22/23: CHANNEL MANAGEMENT/GROUP ASSIGN-
MENT COMMAND
These messages are designed to be used by competent authorities to set AIS VHF and
operational parameters directed at either a specific vessel or region. For example, an AIS
message 22 can be sent to a specific vessel using its MMSI number and direct that vessel’s
AIS transceiver to shift from the traditional AIS frequency to an alternately designated
frequency. Similarly, this same message can be directed to all vessels within a geographic
area and cause their units to shift AIS transmission channels. Message 23 can also direct a
vessel’s or group of vessel’s AIS transceiver into a maximum 15-minute quiet time. These
message types are very dangerous since an adversary can force a vessel to stop broadcasting
and/or receiving AIS data without the vessel even noticing. Even if a vessel did notice the
message, an automated series of commands could be run in quick succession to shift users to
various, random channels, leading to a perceived AIS outage in a particular area. In 2010,
the USCG was conducting NAIS testing and broadcast an AIS message 22 and directed
vessels between Connecticut and North Carolina to shift their broadcasts to non-standard
AIS frequencies, essentially forcing them to become silent to other users and also lose recep-
tion of appropriately tuned AIS users. The USCG stated that “the channel management
information will stay in memory for 5 weeks or until an affected vessel moves more than
500 nautical miles from the defined region. AIS channel management commands can only
be manually overridden or erased by the user via the unit’s channel management function
or automatically overridden via another channel management message for the same defined
region. Re-initializing or resetting your AIS or transmission channels will not necessarily
reprogram your unit back to the default channels [26].” These messages clearly serve an
important purpose from a national security or law enforcement perspective, but there must
be tighter control over their source.
It is clear that AIS lacks two fundamental elements of a secure communication system:
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user authentication and message integrity. The majority of AIS vulnerabilities described
thus far exist because there is no way to verify who is sending a message; thus, all receivers
act blindly in response to any message. Additionally, messages contain no time stamps
which means they can be falsified or replayed at any time. MMSI numbers are required for
every AIS transmission and due to their unique nature, cannot be reused by more than one
vessel throughout the world. However, anyone can simply broadcast a false MMSI number
of their choosing since there is no check to verify whether it belongs to the registered vessel.
This also causes another issue due to the way AIS messages are handled locally among a
group of vessels. If an adversary spoofs an AIS target using the MMSI number of another
vessel within VHF range, the system will cause the target to “jump” around each time the
vessel’s position is broadcast. Essentially, an ill-minded actor can “move” the position of
a real AIS target causing confusion to other vessels in the area. In order to validate that
many of these vulnerabilities exist, I used a simple Software Defined Radio (SDR) setup to
generate, transmit, and receive AIS messages. In Chapter 4, I will describe the background




Despite the existing research that has been conducted on the AIS system, there remains a
very limited set of work that specifically addresses the technical changes needed to implement
security features in the AIS system. Several authors have discussed AIS from a policy
perspective and have offered potential validity checking solutions that are typically shore
based in nature and therefore do not adequately represent realistic solutions to conduct
on-the-fly authentication and message integrity checks during random vessel encounters at
sea [27]. In this chapter, I will explore the research that has been conducted on AIS security
and will also look into the work being done in the aviation and vehicular security fields, as
they face similar challenges.
3.1 AIS SECURITY
In 2014 the authors in [25] conducted what appears to be the first comprehensive se-
curity evaluation and verification of vulnerabilities within the AIS system. Researchers at
Trend Micro Research used SDR to create an AIS transmitter called “AISTX” in GNU Ra-
dio which allowed them to manipulate AIS frame data and test their vulnerabilities. Using
their SDR, they aimed to find the various ways AIS is vulnerable. First, the authors took
a software based approach to conduct spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks by providing
fake vessel data to a popular website MarineTraffic.com. This vulnerability does not neces-
sarily show a weakness in the AIS system itself but highlights the websites that profit off of
the aggregation and sharing of plain-text, publicly available AIS information. The authors’
major contribution came from their creation of an AIS Frame Builder block for use in GNU
Radio and their validation of significant holes in the AIS framework using simple SDR tool
kits.
To overcome the vulnerabilities listed in Chapter 2, the authors recommended implemen-
tation of anomaly detection techniques by VTS or other competent authorities to detect and
flag suspicious activities. The key problems here are identifying which parameters would
need to be set and how to make them detailed enough to detect issues without overwhelming
the system. Additionally, the ocean is a vast international space and identifying an entity
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to oversee offshore issues would likely be logistically impractical. Additionally, the authors
recommended installing X.509 PKI infrastructure to use digital certificates issues by a com-
petent authority to validate AIS users. Digital signatures are a great method to verify the
authenticity of a message, but X.509 certificates carry significant data overhead and are not
feasible for use in the band-limited AIS spectrum [28]. The logistics and architecture of
a global PKI system will also be quite complicated. Additionally, PKI requires database
access to retrieve the public key of any vessel that is encountered, which means either down-
loading and keeping a local copy of every ship in the world’s key, or using an internet-based
lookup service to download keys on-the-fly. Many vessels have limited or non-existent inter-
net access while operating offshore which makes these solutions difficult and would require
operators to consistently sync their devices while connected to the internet. Additionally,
it is difficult to identify one central competent authority who can issue certificates to work
in international waters, waters which are legally not regulated by any one country.
In [29], the authors found and validated similar vulnerabilities to [25] but opted to use
simulated GPS data fed into a standard AIS transmitter instead of SDR. The authors pro-
posed an IEEE 1609 Influenced AIS system where a competent central authority issues a
certificate that validates un-alterable static AIS information on a vessel’s unit. They pro-
posed a three tier system that allows increasing levels of access to information about vessels
around them. For example, tier one is labeled as “navigational safety mode” and only trans-
mits a vessel’s location, course, and speed while protecting private information (which they
identify as everything except positional data). Tier two allows for encrypted exchange of
information between vessels and requires users to accept or reject access to vessel requests
for information. Finally, their third tier is reserved for security organizations and allows
them to access any information about another vessel without requiring their consent. This
solution suffers from the same competent central authority problem as proposed in [25], as
it is based on one trusted central authority granting users private keys. Additionally, this
solution removes many of the most important features about AIS, which includes obtaining
the name, destination, and call sign of another vessel. This information is not private (in
fact, it is required to be written explicitly on the vessel itself) and is extremely useful to
mariners and aids them in conducting proper radio calls and navigating busy waterways
where multiple vessels are located. Although the collision avoidance elements of AIS gained
through positional (GPS) data are important, the situational awareness tools are something
that cannot be removed from the system. Additionally, requiring users to manually ac-
cept/reject requests for AIS information is both cumbersome and unrealistic for a mariner
34
navigating a congested waterway. Transiting through areas such as the Panama Canal,
Strait of Malacca, or even New York Harbor often includes hundreds or even thousands of
AIS targets, and manually or automatically sorting this data would not be possible and
could even be distracting and dangerous.
[28] built upon the recommendation from [25] to implement SecureAIS, which is a
software-only method to provide encryption and authentication using a pairwise key de-
veloped within the bandwidth constraints of the existing AIS infrastructure. Their method-
ology uses Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certification scheme and Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm. The ECQV implicit certification
differs from a traditional certificate in that it can be extracted by a third-party using the
implicit certificate of a CA (in the form of a cryptographic value) and identification data of
another user (such as their MMSI). In order to generate an individual user’s prublic/private
keys using the ECQV scheme, the following variables must be defined. First, the elliptic
curve group, ε and a generator, G, as well as a hash function, H(-) are all required to ensure
functions are of the same format. The CA has a public key, C, known to all users and a
private key, c. Requesting the implicit certificate, M, is done by a user with ID I by first
generating a pseudo-random number, n. Next, N = n ∗G is computed and sent to the CA
who also generates their own pseudo-random number, k. The CA can then compute the
implicit certificate using Eq. 14 and the implicit signature, s, using Eq. 15.
M = N + k ∗G (14)
s = c+ k ∗H(M, I) (15)
These are then sent to the user who can verify their authenticity and then finally com-
putes its private key using Eq. 16 and Eq. 17.
p = s+ n ∗H(M, I) (16)
P = p ∗G (17)
Finally, using this information it is possible for any user who knows M (the implicit
certificate) to generate another user’s public key using Eq. 18 while only knowing their
identity.
P = C +H(M, I) ∗M (18)
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These public key certificates can be extracted faster and require less data transfer than
a traditional X.509 certificate as proposed by the authors in [25] which did not consider
the size of the existing AIS data packets. To implement this system in the AIS framework,
the authors note that a two phase process is required. The first phase is the “setup phase”
which is done every time the AIS transceiver is turned on and the public and private keys
are generated using the previous equations above. The role of the CA is played by a
central maritime authority such as the IMO and the identity information of each vessel is a
combination of the MMSI number and the expiration date of the cryptography provided by
the CA. The second phase called the “online phase” occurs when two vessels interact and
need to share information, which is done using AIS binary messages (Type 6). This is done
through an ECDH scheme and involves a series of transmissions back and forth between two
vessels where they share cryptological information. First, a randomly generated nonce, MA,
and security level indicator (specifying desired security level) is sent from user A to user B.
User B will validate the information received, check whether the materials provided are not
expired, and verify that it can locally support the security level indicated by user A. User
B stores the nonce and then uses Eq. 18 to generate the public key of user A. Finally, user
B generates a temporary session key that is sent back to user A along with MB generated
in the setup phase and a randomly generated nonce. User A performs the same functions
as user B to generate the public key of user B, and then generates an authentication proof
using the temporary session key which it will send to user B so that they can verify that
only user A could have sent the message. User B can now use the two nonces generated
during the exchange to generate a final session key that is sent to user A who computes
the same process, resulting in a mutually agreed upon key to be used for symmetric key
cryptography between the two users. As long as the certificates remain valid, this exchange
only needs to happen the first time two users interact and subsequent meetings can use the
same session key. The authors used the software ProVerif to verify that their protocol is
secure against man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. They also verified their protocol using
a X310 SDR and completed several experiments to examine data and time usage to establish
their secure connections. First, using the largest, 256 bit, security level required 20 time
slots to establish a shared key compared to 96 time slots for an X.509, a 79% reduction in
overhead. Using 80-bit security requires only 10 time slots with secureAIS, 20% reduction
in overhead from 50 time slots required with X.509 certificates suggested by [25].
However, this method suffers from several issues. First, even at the lowest level of
security users must exchange 10 total messages to conduct sender/receiver authentication
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and establish a session key. Given that each frame is 2250 time slots, this means that only 225
simultaneous pairs of users (450 total) would be able to authenticate with each other at one
time in one geographic area before overwhelming the TDMA scheme. This also opens up a
new DoS attack where an adversary simply floods a user with bogus authentication attempts,
effectively jamming their AIS transceiver from functioning in its primary navigational safety
role. This could also potentially starve an entire geographic area of available transmission
time on the network, limiting overall AIS transmissions.
In [30], an IBE scheme was proposed that follows IEEE 1363.3-2013 for Identity-Based
Cryptography. Similar to [28], the authors propose a PKI system but use the vessel’s MMSI
number as the public key along with private keys obtained from a CA. They proposed several
different modes to provide varying levels of security including anonymous authentication,
public authentication, and symmetric key encryption. Their proposed authentication and
encryption modes increase message overhead requirements are between 331 and over 700 bits.
The most realistic advantage of this system is that vessels can simply derive an unknown
vessel’s public key from their MMSI number without consulting a database. However, there
are significant issues with the large overhead they are including in their messages.
In [31], the design description of the USCG’s Encrypted AIS (EAIS) system is discussed,
which is an actual implementation and utilization of a government blue-force tracking tool
that is currently in service. Similar to the proposals in [28, 30], this method uses AIS
Messages 6 and 8 (binary messages) to transmit an AIS packet formatted similar to those
set forth in the ITU standard. The specifics of each type of message are laid out in the
document but remains largely unchanged from those shown in Chapter 2. The system in-
cludes three modes of operation: normal, receive-only and restricted. With all three modes
both un-encrypted and encrypted transmissions are always received, meaning these modes
only affect the type of outgoing AIS messages. Normal mode operates as a traditional AIS
transceiver where all messages are sent out un-encrypted. In receive-only mode, the AIS
transmitter maintains radio silence and does not transmit any messages. Finally, restricted
mode encrypts all outgoing AIS messages. Transmissions remain on the normal AIS frequen-
cies but restricted & receive-only modes do not permit the transceiver to be commanded to
change frequencies. The format of message type 6 remains largely unaltered from the ITU
standard, but the payload is encrypted using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
AES was adopted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as the U.S.
standard symmetric block cipher. AES is extremely safe, and there are currently no known
methods to break it. AES is capable of encrypting data in blocks of 128 bits [32]. The
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EAIS system has the option to encrypt data using AES using 128-896 bits, which means
packets are a total size of 144-912 bits. Depending on the length of the ASCII characters
included in the data fields, this means the message will occupy between 2-5 TDMA slots.
This system clearly works and meets the basic tenants of the security standards as it uses
a government approved symmetric key encryption. However, symmetric key cryptography
requires that all parties adhere to one standard, use one shared (and secret) key, and en-
crypt their entire messages. This would not scale to the public shipping community as the
integrity of the symmetric key would come into question, as well as the ability to distribute
and regulate such a system. Additionally, encrypted and confidential information is not
a requirement nor a design feature of the AIS system. Government vessels require EAIS
in order to conceal their position when operating in a law-enforcement capacity, but they
maintain an increased burden and liability to monitor vessel traffic around them. These
capabilities are not necessary for public shipping and actually defeat the original purpose of
AIS, which was to be used as an enhanced situation awareness and collision avoidance tool.
While this system is fairly straightforward to implement, it is not the right route to pursue
for general AIS security.
In [5], Luft et al. from the U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center looked
at methods to improve the performance of the AIS radio-link between fixed locations. When
AIS was originally created, safety of navigation dictated that receiving corrupted data (in-
valid position/course/speed) was worse than receiving no data, so any message that failed
CRC should be immediately discarded. In their research, they analyzed AIS from a surveil-
lance perspective and developed a method to retain weak messages that failed the CRC
using several physical-layer properties including time, frequency, antenna polarization, and
radio path. These messages may be weak due to propagation or path-loss from distant tar-
gets. They identified that bit-stuffing can be problematic in these weak messages and opted
to transmit a Message Type 26 without bit-stuffing and modified the receiver to match.
Their system essentially acts as a repeater which packages AIS messages as the payload of a
Message Type 26 and extends the range of AIS beyond the traditional VHF range without
using satellites or other over-the-horizon (OTH) communications capabilities. This research
provides several physical-layer avenues of research to explore which could provide further
improvements in AIS security.
In [33], Kessler presents Protected AIS (pAIS) as a proof-of-concept to demonstrate
that a PKI system similar to Mode 2 from [30] can be implemented within the current
ITU technical standard, essentially allowing for immediate roll out to the existing maritime
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community. This system uses the private key of a sender to encode an 8-bit checksum over an
entire AIS message and a message time stamp to generate a “protect string”. As this message
is now longer than the current expected AIS message, existing receivers would simply ignore
the protect string extension while updated ones with pAIS would correctly decode the
private key using the sender’s public key and establish the authenticity of the message.
While this implementation proves that backward comparability is relatively straight forward
with this method, there are still several limitations that are not addressed. There is no
geographic validity checking, which still means that a transmitter is capable of sending out
GPS coordinates that could be false (assuming they have access to a valid PKI token).
Additionally, since this was aimed as a proof-of-concept idea, the type and distribution of
public/private keys is addressed only generally, and future work would require significant
technical research into how this would be conducted, as it contributes significantly to the
message overhead and thus the channel bandwidth.
3.2 NON-MARITIME INDUSTRY SECURITY
Due to the limited research into AIS, I turned to the aviation and vehicular network
industries as they are currently facing similar challenges. The aviation industry’s Auto-
matic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system suffers from many of the same
vulnerabilities as AIS and due to the increased danger in their industry as well as a 2020
requirement to be carried aboard all commercial and military aircraft, there has been much
more research conducted into mitigating these threats. In [34] ideas such as spread spectrum
and frequency hopping, symmetric key cryptography, and PKI schemes are all analyzed as
viable options but the authors conclude that they are difficult to scale due to issues with
message overhead size and distribution and integrity of a key management system. Secure
location verification is also identified as a way to correlate the position sent from an ADS-B
transceiver by solving a geometric equation using time difference of arrival (TDOA) from
several antennas located at known positions. While this solution would be feasible in the
maritime domain since the geometric equation does not need to consider height as it would
in aviation, this solution also lacks the ability to be scaled beyond internal and coastal
waters, is subject to multipath propagation, and requires independent agency verification
and notification of positional inaccuracies. Additionally, identifying the location of ships
near the shore would be difficult due to the limited dimension of sensor location unless
off-shore antennas were installed. The authors also proposed a retroactive key publication
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system based on the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) pro-
tocol. TESLA is a scalable and loss-tolerant broadcast authentication protocol that uses
message authentication codes (MAC) to validate the authenticity of uses [35, 36]. Unlike
typical PKI systems, TESLA uses the time-delayed release of the key values used to gen-
erate a hash chain in a manner than mathematically ensures that all messages must have
originated from the same source. Additional work has been done by the original authors to
create a lightweight version called µTESLA in [37] and to provide immediate authentica-
tion of packets instead of delayed buffering [38]. This has been applied for sensor networks
such as in [39], vehicular networks in [40], and a recent practical implementation has been
developed using SDR for ADS-B in [41]. To our knowledge, there has been no effort to
adapt the TESLA protocol to the AIS system.
In [22], Ronald Reisman of the NASA Ames Research Center provides the description
of a blockchain-based PKI framework to mitigate the security risks identified in the ADS-B
aviation system. The idea is based on IBM’s Hyperledger Fabric which is an open source
blockchain platform. The author’s goal was to implement a system that allowed for simul-
taneous secure and non-secure communications within the same channel through the use of
“chaincode”, similar to smart contracts used by the most popular open-source blockchain
technology, Ethereum. Hyperledger fabric provides Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
which allows for a more permission-based network as opposed to the permission-less systems
used in other public blockchain technologies. Another important difference is that Fabric
users must be enrolled in the network through a Membership Service Provider (MSP) which
provides greater flexibility in providing more computationally efficient consensus algorithms
such as Crash Fault Tolerance, rather than the BFT used in other anonymous services.
Fabric also provides the ability to use a PKI structure that allows for authentication and
encryption of communications. The authors note that the “on-ramp” issue, adding users
on a global scale, will be the biggest hurdle to overcome as previous attempts have suffered
from confusing international conventions. In their architecture, they attempt to overcome
this challenge by using a Root CA and geographically distributed intermediate CAs (Peer
Nodes) to handle the enrollment of end users. Every Peer Node holds an identical copy of all
transactions, but unlike traditional blockchain, individual users are not required to maintain
copies. This allows for private networks to be established where data can flow unrestricted
from aircraft to Air Traffic Control, as well as within groups of aircraft such as military or
civilian airlines. A prototype was also introduced that allowed aircraft within three nautical
miles of each other to exchange safety of flight information. Hyperledger Fabric represents
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a very interesting research opportunity for AIS and could be applied to AIS in a simi-
lar manner to ADS-B where vessels are grouped to exchange data (military/government,
commercial, recreational) with various permissions included. However, this solution would
require an entire overhaul of the AIS data link from the ground up and would see a massive
on-ramp issue in getting users to shift from the current AIS structure to a new blockchain
based solution. Instead, I believe the biggest benefit of blockchain technology for AIS would
involve using the distributed ledger to ease the burden of public/private key exchange and
allow for vessels throughout the world to easily conduct authentication without concern for
compromised keys or complex international regulations.
Research into Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANET) is extremely pertinent to AIS since
they function in a very similar manner to the way maritime vessels interact on the ocean.
That is, the nodes exchange data between each other in a self-organized manner without in-
teraction from outside entities. As shown in Chapter 2, the decentralized nature of PGP has
led several MANET researchers to use it as a backbone to institute a PKI structure without
the need for a CA. In [42], a self-organized PKI system is presented that allows individual
users to generate public/private key pairs and authenticate other users. Authentication is
performed through a chain of public-key certificates where a user checks the validity of each
subsequent public key signature via the previous public key until that chain ultimately re-
sults in the validity of the desired end-user’s public key. The lack of a CA comes at a cost,
and that is felt through a significant data exchange with a lot of message overhead. For ex-
ample, for two users to conduct authentication they must merge their certificate repositories,
which they both had to store locally. Obviously as the network size increases, the storage
required at each local user will become significant and exchange of that data could become
quite a bottleneck. To overcome these large message overhead and bandwidth challenges,
the authors in [43] present a PGP-like trust establishment scheme which uses certificate-less
self-certifying IBE for authentication. Instead of exchanging trust-chains, this method al-
lows individual users to compute another user’s public key on demand, implicitly achieving
self-certification of authenticity when a trust path exists. To use this model, if a node, ni,
trusts another node, nj, ni issues a “witness” Wij over a secure channel. nj uses Wij to
generate its private key, cryptographically binding Wij to the identity of nj. Since this is an
IBE scheme, any node that trusts ni can compute the public key of nj. There are two levels
of trust assumed here, level 1 and level 2, whose indices generate a “trust graph”. Level 1
trust means that a node trusts the public key of another node, while Level 2 trust means a
node trusts another to issue witnesses and recommend other nodes. Trust values here are
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in the range [0, 1] and represent the reliability of a node where higher values equate to more
trust. As users in the network interact, weighted trust paths are established, reducing the
ability of malicious intermediate nodes to completely derail the system by falsifying public
keys. The authors here used ECC for key generation and found that compared to [42], their
model was much more computationally efficient and required significantly less overhead. For
example, with 500 users and a path length between users of 20, certificate-less web-of-trust
required .25 KB storage, compared to 1500 KB in [42]. Additionally, total communication
cost was reduced from 733MB in [42] to 140 KB in certificate-less web-of-trust. While tra-
ditional PGP-style schemes would be unable to scale to the millions of vessels using AIS
every day, this scheme uses both IBE as well as a decentralized infrastructure and may be
computationally efficient enough to use within the AIS architecture. However, this would
likely require significant changes to the AIS technical standards and may not be backward
compatible with existing transceivers. This research may be worth looking into in the fu-
ture to deal with maritime public/private key exchanges and eliminate the need to store a
multitude of public keys.
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CHAPTER 4
SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO IMPLEMENTATION OF AIS
In this section, I will provide a brief background on Software Defined Radio and then
explain how I used this tool to create a working AIS transmitter and receiver that provides
a highly robust test platform for researching improvements in the AIS system.
4.1 SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO BACKGROUND
In the early 1990s, Joseph Mitola first described the architecture details of software radio,
or Software Defined Radio (SDR), as a device that can easily reconfigure itself to select
the best transmission mode and adapt to the current environment based on cost, service
availability, or signal quality [44]. SDR allows for physical layer hardware components of
a radio system to be implemented using software, which allows for a highly customizable
and reconfigurable system that can be changed “on the fly”. Ideally, the only hardware
components that would need to be included in a SDR are the antenna and a high-speed
sampler [45]. For my research, I used a USRP B200 as my transmitter and a RTL-2832U as
my receiver. I also used the GNU Radio Software to build the radio block diagrams which
simulate the radio hardware components.
4.1.1 USRP B200
The Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) B200mini by Ettus Research is a SDR
that retails for approximately $902.00 USD. This device comes with USB 3.0 SuperSpeed
connectivity and can be interfaced using USRP Hardware Driver (UHD) open-source soft-
ware version 3.9.0 or later. There are three inputs which can be seen in the block diagram
of the device in Fig. 15(a): transmit, receive, and reference [46].
The features of the B200 are as follows:
 Frequency range: 70 MHz-6 GHz
 Full duplex operation with 56 MHz instantaneous bandwidth (61.44 MS/s quadrature)
 Open and reconfigurable Spartan 6 XC6SLX75 FPGA with free Xilinx tools
 Gain: 76dB available at receiver and 89.8 dB available at transmitter
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(a) USRP B200 [46].
(b) Nooelec NESDR Smart RTL [45].
Fig. 15: Internal block diagram comparison of USRP and RTL SDR.
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4.1.2 NOOELEC NESDR SMART RTL-2832U
The NooElec NESDR RTL is a much more inexpensive SDR aimed at the amateur radio
market and retails for only $29.95 USD. This device is approximately the size of a stick
of gum and is only capable of handling one antenna in a receive-only mode with a much
smaller bandwidth than the USRP. An internal diagram of the RTL device can be seen in
Fig. 15(b).
The features of the device are as follows [47]:
 Frequency range: 25MGz-1.75GHz
 Aluminium enclosure
 SMA female antenna input
 2.4MHz (nominal) and up to 3.2MHz (max) bandwidth
 Gain: 29 settings from 0-49.6
4.1.3 GNU RADIO COMPANION
GNU Radio Companion software is a powerful graphical user interface tool that allows
for a robust implementation of signal processing tools. GNU Radio began as a project at
MIT in 2004 with Matt Ettus as one of the first developers who created the USRP hardware
platform for use with GNU radio software. In 2009, Josh Blum distributed the GNU Radio
Companion (GRC) software at the annual “Hackfest”. It was a “drag and drop” software
front-end that acts as a Python code-generator when compiled [48]. I used GNU Radio
3.7.13.5 on a PC running the Linux Ubuntu operating system.
OpenCPN Chart Plotter
Since this research was conducted about a maritime collision avoidance device, I naturally
needed a method to display the data I received in a similar manner to the electronic chart
display information system (ECDIS) software used about most commercial vessels. To
do this, I used OpenCPN which is an open source chart plotter that contains significant
documentation on their GITHub page [49]. OpenCPN allows for the installation of current
nautical charts, although these are not necessary to see the AIS data. Instead, they provide
a more realistic view of vessel locations especially when plotting real ship traffic.
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Fig. 16: AIS Transmitter Block Diagram using GNU Radio
4.2 SDR AIS TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER
Using GNU Radio, I built upon the work of [25] to design and test a wireless AIS
transmitter and receiver that is capable of sending and receiving real AIS packets, decoding
them, and plotting them on an ECDIS style chart plotter using OpenCPN. First, the AIS
transmitter remains largely unchanged from [25], but the authors did not connect their setup
over-the-air and instead opted to use a wired connection for transmission. The designed
transmitter is shown in Fig. 16
I opted to conduct transmissions in the unlicensed 900MHz frequency band to avoid any
potential interference with actual AIS transmissions. However, I did test my AIS receiver
using the default AIS channels 1/2 of 162MHz at a nearby river at the Great Bridge Lock
in Chesapeake, VA and was able to receive recreational and commercial AIS transmissions
directly to my laptop. Note that the “sentence” within the AIS Frame Builder block is a
binary string of data converted from an AIVDM message containing the correct parameters
for the desired message type to be sent. At the receiver, the Osmocom NESDR Smart
RTL-SDR is tuned to 915MHz to receive the signal. This is shown in Fig. 17.
The signal is then sent to two separate FIR filters at Channel A and B, followed by a
quadrature demodulation, and then down-sampling to 48,000 samples/second. Finally, this
data is interleaved and sent to a file sink which contains a named UNIX pipe. This UNIX
46
Fig. 17: AIS Receiver Block Diagram using GNU Radio
pipe is used to send the data from GNU Radio to GNU AIS, which is an open source AIS
program that converts the received AIS message into a format readable by the chart plotter.
To correctly receive the data, the output file must be a unix pipe which can be created using
the following command:
mkfifo aisfifo
This generates a unix pipe called “aisfifo” and the output file in the GRC file sink should
be pointed to the location of where this pipe was created. Now the GRC flowgraph can be
run with the data sent to the named unix pipe, followed by the GNU AIS program from
the command line which will route the data to OpenCPN chart plotter. This can be done
by following the command below:
gnuais -l aisfifo -c /̃.config/gnuais/config
The −l command provides the program with the name of the source file to read from,
while the −c command provides it with the location of the configuration file where you
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can configure the data to be sent to another location. I modified this configuration file to
send the data through a virtual serial port so it can be displayed on OpenCPN. To create
a virtual serial port, I used the socat program on Linux using the following commands:
socat -d -d pipe:ais pipe pty &
This generates a named pipe called ais pipe. The output of this command will tell
you the name of the virtual serial port, which should be of the form: /dev/pts/6. To send
the AIS data to OpenCPN, you must configure the virtual serial port on OpenCPN. Within
OpenCPN, you must go to ‘Options’, ‘Connections’, and then ‘Add Connection’ and then
choose a Serial connection and input the name of the Serial port from the previous step
which was obtained using the ‘Socat’ command. Using the above example, the serial port
would be input as /dev/pts/6.
The final step is to edit the configuration file that gnuais uses so that the received data
can be sent to the virtual serial port. Note: there are two pipes being used in this scenario.
The first pipe, called aisfifo sends data from GNU Radio to GNU AIS. The second pipe,
called ais pipe (created using socat) sends data from GNU AIS to OpenCPN. To edit the
configuration file, complete the following: Navigate to the config file for GNU AIS and there
should be a default line commented out that says # serial port /dev/ttyS0. Uncomment
this and change it to match the serial port you created using the socat command. In my
example above, this would read as follows:
serial port /dev/pts/6
Additional configuration can be done in this file such as sending the data to a SQL
database or server for further processing. Now that this is installed and serial ports are
configured, running the transmitter and receiver in unison should see your vessels populating
on the chart. The latitude and longitude I chose are specific to the Chesapeake, VA area.
Based on these tests, it is clear that there is absolutely nothing that prevents anyone with
a SDR from impersonating any vessel on the ocean and completely falsifying their position,
course, and speed. Additionally, using this same methodology you can generate fake ATON
and send Channel Management and Group Assignment commands which would effectively
cut users out of the AIS data link altogether. The simple fact that there is nothing stopping
an individual from transmitting fake AIS targets is alarming and validates vulnerabilities
1-9 from Chapter 2. Without proper authority, it would be unethical to showcase these
vulnerabilities using actual vessels, but the possibility exists that an individual armed with
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Fig. 18: Spoofed AIS Target Transmitted from SDR Transmitter to SDR Receiver and
plotted in OpenCPN
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a SDR and a VHF antenna in a major harbor or congested waterway could cause significant
disruptions or even a collision. The simple idea of confusing a VTS in a busy waterway such
as New York Harbor could potentially be enough to cause individuals to lose concentration
and allow a collision to occur. Based on the work here, I believe it is imperative that user
authentication and integrity be included in the AIS message protocol. By including these
two crucial security features, there would be no way for me to transmit data as any MMSI,
since a receiver could simply receive a notification that the sender is not authentic. Data
encryption is not a necessary feature since AIS data should remain public; every vessel on
the ocean should be able to know the position, course, and speed of all others around them;
there is no secret that must be shared. However, every mariner deserves to know that the
data received from the vessels around them is authentic, so a solution must be implemented
which can seamlessly include this feature without obscuring the use of AIS as a publicly




Previous works to update the security of AIS have all focused on an entirely PKI based
solution that necessarily includes significant increases in packet sizes and subsequently the
number of consecutive message slots required for an individual to send autonomous position
reports. AIS operates in a bandwidth constrained environment with only 2,250 time slots
available every minute (4,500 using both channels), so keeping packet sizes to a minimum
should be a key goal of any AIS authentication protocol. Therefore, I have looked to aviation
and other transportation industries in order to shed light on alternative methods that can be
adapted to the unique challenges of the maritime environment. The Timed Efficient Stream
Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol was referenced as a possible solution for
ADS-B security and functions as an asymmetric cryptography system without the need to
protect and share secret keys between users, reducing message exchange and ultimately
freeing up TDMA slots for other transmissions. In this section, I will discuss an update to
the AIS system that embeds a HMAC onto AIS packets that were generated from a pseudo-
random function (PRF) using keys initially known only to the sender and are periodically
broadcast to all stations. Since the authentication protocol implied by TESLA involves
only software processing of the data bits, it can be implemented by adding a software
update to the existing AIS software to process the authentication packets. Specifically, the
existing AIS software would handle physical layer data conversion (GMSK demodulation
and NRZI decoding) followed by processing of the additional link layer functions if the new
type of authentication packets is detected, as shown in Fig. 19. If no authentication packets
are detected, which is an indication that a user has not yet updated the AIS to include
authentication, the new authentication component of the updated AIS system is bypassed
and the AIS software would function as it currently does, with an additional note on the
vessel’s chart plotter/RADAR mentioning that “authentication is not available”.
In the following section, I will describe the premise of the TESLA protocol which will
allow for better understanding of how it can be adapted for use in the AIS system.
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Fig. 19: Interfacing the TESLA-based authentication component with the existing AIS.
5.1 TIMED EFFICIENT STREAM LOSS-TOLERANT
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
The TESLA protocol was introduced in the context of multicast communications to
enable receivers to verify that the received data originated with the claimed source and
was not modified as it transited through the network [35, 38, 36]. To accomplish this task,
TESLA replicates asymmetric cryptography principles such that a receiver can authenticate
the source of a message without being able to reproduce the authenticated message. The
requirements of the TESLA protocol include:
 Loose time synchronization of users, which is satisfied by the universal time coordina-
tion (UTC) feature of the existing AIS system.
 Access to a pseudo-random function (PRF) family or “one-way function”, F such
that F (k) = x, such that given x, k cannot be back-computed and F cannot be
distinguished. Additionally, given k, F (k) will always produce the output x.
To begin the protocol, the sender will choose a random value, Kn to begin a PRF chain
of length n. Using PRF F , the sender first computes Kn−1 = F (Kn) which is the initial
commitment to the PRF chain. The remaining keys up to K0 are computed using this
same format, essentially computing F of every value in a chain. This proves one of the most
important principles of TESLA: loss tolerance. Since Kn−1 = F (Kn) and each K is produced
recursively using F , then any receiver who receives any Kn value is able to produce all prior
key commitments. However, the properties of the PRF mean that this same receiver will
be unable to forward-compute any other keys and thus would be unable to replicate the
sender. The sender will also determine a time release schedule, ∆t, for which each of the
Kn will be released, with each key being active during one time interval. Starting at time
T0, the sender will release the first key K0 and then release K1 at T1 = T0 + ∆t, and so on
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Fig. 20: TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol: Key Generation, Use, and Reveal,
n = 5.
until all n keys are released. If any receiver misses the release of a key during a certain time
interval (due to packet loss or other conditions), they can simply derive prior keys using the
PRF to validate prior messages. It is important to note that while this system establishes
a sound link between the initial message released and all messages in the chain, this only
proves that messages all originated from the same source. In order to prove the identity of
that source, some form of PKI validation must occur. We will assume that the source of
the first key has been validated as authentic, and thus all remaining keys derived from this
must also be valid. The TESLA protocol can be seen in Fig. 20.
The sender must broadcast their ∆t and T0, as well as the first key in the key chain
commitment, K0. This is done in time interval Ti by sending a packet, Pj such that
Pj = [Mj|MAC(Mj|Ki)|Ki−1]. This means for the current time interval, the sender is
broadcasting a plain text message along with the previous time interval’s key and has ap-
pended a MAC comprised of the next time interval’s key and the message itself. This will
allow the user (upon receipt of the subsequent packet) to verify the integrity of the Pj. Since
this is a broadcast protocol, all receivers will obtain Pj, which means that they have to en-
sure that only the sender could have produced the message using information available to
them prior to the disclosure interval. Using the initial time delay schedule published at the
start of their broadcast transmissions, the receiver can calculate the current time interval
and verify that the message they received was not sent after T0 + i ∗∆t. If it was, anyone
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Fig. 21: TESLA Sender and Receiver Overview.
could have sent that message (since the key is now public) and thus the receiver would
discard the message as unauthentic. If the time interval is valid, then Pj can be validated
using the key from the previous interval. If this is the first message from a specific user,
then the receiver simply stores this info to a buffer and awaits for the next transmission. If
the receiver already has a key in the buffer, then they can use the key they just received to
compute the MAC[Ki−1|Mi−1] and it should be equivalent to the MAC in the prior message
that was stored in the buffer. This process can be seen in Fig. 21.
5.2 SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, I consider an update to the AIS system which embeds a TESLA MAC
onto AIS packets that were generated from a PRF chain initially known only to the sender
with keys periodically broadcast to all stations. Since AIS is already a UTC time syn-
chronized protocol, this would allow the creation of an asymmetric cryptography scheme
where the time-delayed release of PRF keys are used to verify the source and integrity of
prior messages. This design would implement new message types (beyond the current 27
currently in use) that contain a minor modification to the existing data sent within an AIS
frame. This would essentially use Message Type 28-Message Type 55 to create authenti-
cated versions of existing Message Types 1-27. For example: Message Type 28 would be
an authenticated version of Message Type 1 (scheduled position report), Message Type 29
would be an authenticated version of Message Type 21 (ATON report). This would also
allow the system to be implemented as a software-only solution that can be adapted to cur-
rent AIS transceivers and immediately interact with the maritime community. Additionally,
modern hash algorithms meet the requirements of a PRF and will not remain “secret” for
very long periods of time, so the likelihood of conducting even a brute-force attack on any
one chain would be almost impossible for the 80-bit hash function proposed. Although this
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paper does not attempt to delve into a comparison between various hash function families
and their associated mathematical proofs, it is sufficient to say that modern hash functions,
even truncated in length, provide more than adequate security over the extremely short
time spans that have been used in this paper.
The model requires the following key participating users:
 Central Authority (FCC, IMO, or other national licensing agency to provide and
distribute private keys)
 Vessel A, Transmitting Ship
 Vessel B, Receiving Ship, within VHF range of Vessel A
The benefits of TESLA AIS system include:
 Resistant to packet loss
 Limited overhead size: Rapid changing of cryptographic hash functions means less
data needs to be used per hash
 Minor updates to current packet structure
 Can be implemented as a software-only upgrade to existing AIS systems using spare,
unused message types defined by ITU (i.e. legacy transceivers can simply check the
message type and simply pass it through if it is not applicable)
This model contains the following modes of operation, which will be further explained
in detail:
 Setup: Generation of hash chain and key delay schedule
 Online: Broadcast delayed disclosure of hash chain keys over VHF channel
 Receiver Verification: Validate the identity of users
– Confirm message type (to confirm compatibility or pass legacy messages straight
through to original system)
– Validate digital signature of K0 to confirm identity, and if so, user is Trusted
– Compute hash of current key and compare to previous keys to verify trusted user
has sent messages, user is Verified
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Fig. 22: Two vessel interaction using the existing AIS infrastructure; Vessel B is transmitting
incorrect AIS data and Vessel A has no choice but to assume it is accurate.
The goal of our TESLA authentication scheme is to provide existing AIS users with a
way to validate the source of incoming AIS messages and ensure they have been unaltered
by an adversary while limiting individual message sizes to ensure multiple access to many
simultaneous users. Using the existing AIS framework, a typical encounter on the ocean
occurs as depicted in Fig. 22.
Vessel A is transiting international waters and comes within VHF range of Vessel B.
Vessel A’s country of origin is Panama, and it has never encountered Vessel B, whose AIS
static data shows that they hail from Spain. Since the vessels are not in sight of one another,
Vessel A cannot determine whether the data they are receiving from Vessel B is accurate
and therefore must trust that they are accurately reporting their information. International
standards require both vessels to ensure their transmissions are accurate, but enforcement of
these standards is subject to the vessel’s flag state which results in various levels of adherence
to the rules. As Vessel A and Vessel B continue to transit toward one another, Vessel B’s
AIS data is used onboard Vessel A to compute the closest point of approach (CPA) which
is a measurement used to determine maneuvers based on international navigation rules. As
Vessel B comes within sight of Vessel A, the watch keeper notices that there are differences
between what they see visually and what the AIS data shows (different vessel name, size,
course). The watch keeper now devotes extra time to observing this vessel until they are
past and clear due to their loss of confidence in the information they have received about
the vessel.
56
In the updated authentication protocol, this same encounter would occur as follows:
Vessel A is transiting international waters and comes within VHF range of Vessel B. Vessel
B broadcasts a position report that contains a digitally signed hash chain key commitment
and a MAC. Vessel A receives Vessel B’s position report, retrieves Vessel B’s public key from
a database and upon receipt of the next message from Vessel B, compares the contents of
their digital signature with the MAC from their previous message using the new key chain
sent by vessel B in their latest message. On Vessel A, the public key retrieved from the
database associated with the vessel’s MMSI does not validate the private key Vessel B has
used to signed their message, and the system returns an error message stating that “Vessel
B is not trusted.” This is due to the fact that Vessel B is not actually the vessel associated
with the MMSI they are broadcasting; if they were, their position reports would be signed
with the proper private key. Vessel A now knows that the identity of Vessel B cannot
be confirmed, so they can proceed to steer clear of this vessel in order to avoid negative
interactions.
As shown here, an authentication protocol greatly improves the confidence a vessel op-
erator has in the data they are receiving and alerts the user when data should be subject to
scrutiny. In the next section, I will discuss how this system can be implemented to operate
within the existing AIS framework.
5.3 IMPLEMENTING TESLA IN AIS
As discussed in Section 5.1, implementation of the TESLA protocol requires senders to
have a set message delay disclosure interval, ∆t, for the release of subsequent keys. However,
multiple messages can be sent in one time interval using the same key, meaning that multiple
messages would need to be stored on the receiver’s end at one time, but we do not expect
this storage requirement to be significant. To calculate the storage, we must consider the
reporting interval required of users. The maximum nominal reporting interval that could
be required by any vessel is a Class A mobile user operating at fast speeds and changing
course, and requires position updates every 2 s, or about once every 75 time slots [1].
The use of SOTDMA in the AIS facilitates including the TESLA protocol for authenti-
cation. When operating in autonomous and continuous mode, SOTDMA allows the 2, 250
available TDMA frames within one UTC minute to be assigned without conflict by using a
slot offset counter to identify the number of frames remaining for transmission by the cur-
rent user. Upon first entering the network, the AIS user will follow an initialization protocol
that monitors the link for 1 minute to create a map of the transmission slots currently in
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use by other users. In addition, the following terms are used to address transmission within
the link:
 The reporting interval, between 2 s and 30 s
2 ≤ RI ≤ 30.
 The number of position reports required per minute
RR = 60/RI.
 The number of slots before the user will need to transmit
NI = 2250/RR.
 The first slot used to announce entry to link NSS.
 Slot number selected for position reports
NS = NSS
for first transmission in frame, and
NS = NSS + (n ∗NI), 0 ≤ n ≤ RR
for subsequent frames.
 The collection of possible slots for a position report
SI = [NS − (0.1 ∗NI), NS + (0.1 ∗NI)].
At a minimum, a user transmitting once every 30 seconds would require NI = 1125,
which implies that the user would need to transmit its position once every 1125 slots (once
per UTC minute). With a randomly chosen nominal transmission slot NTS, from within
the possible SI values, the distance between frames will not always be spaced the same
number of slots apart. To overcome this challenge, we can allow ∆t = 1 min for all users,
which implies that all messages sent within the same UTC minute contain a MAC with the
same key, and allows key disclosure to occur in conjunction with the UTC minute in order
to synchronize key disclosures by all users. Aside from vessels moored or at anchor (not
moving), all vessels operating in autonomous mode report their position at least once per
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minute. Therefore, using ∆t = 1 min, each user would disclose the key to decode all messages
from the previous UTC minute within their first transmission of the current UTC minute.
This would simply mean that a receiver will need to buffer up to 30 messages at a time if a
sender is operating at the maximum reporting rate of 2 s reporting. One potential problem
with this approach is that up to 30 messages may have been sitting in a buffer and have not
been viewed by the user, resulting in reporting delays in the AIS. As the AIS information is
extremely time sensitive due to its use in collision avoidance, we note that the buffered data
on the receiver side should be initially assumed to be accurate until proven otherwise and
should be immediately used for course plotting as the system would still maintain the ability
to retroactively flag unauthentic data from the prior minute. As an alternative, ∆t may be
reduced to RI and the sender required to initially publish their NSS upon admission to
the AIS network. This would allow key disclosure to be conducted at each NTS making
reports delayed by only the reporting rate. The receiver would need to verify that the
received message was sent prior to the NTS plus a factor of the high bound of the SI. This
would require minimal additional overhead from the sender but would allow for more rapid
message authentication at a delay equal to the reporting rate. To ensure authentication at
the same rate as initially intended by the ITU standard, reporting rates would need to be
increased to twice their current rate. For example, a unit currently reporting once every 2 s
would need to use ∆t = 1 s in order to generate an authenticated position at the receiver
every 2 s. It is also worth noting that the length N of the authentication hash chain is not
a significant factor for implementing the TESLA authentication protocol in the AIS, and
that an authentication hash chain of length N only requires log2(N) storage and can be
computed with that same amount of power. Depending on the key disclosure rate, more
keys may be necessary, which is an important factor in determining N . If keys are disclosed
at the maximum reporting rate of once every 2 s, this would require 30 keys per minute or
1800 keys per hour. Using 10 byte keys, this would imply an additional storage requirement
between 30 bytes and 18 KB of data to store. Therefore, storage is not a significant concern
since hash chains are fixed length and do not grow exponentially in size as the chain grows
larger. In order to provide the most robust and up-to-date data for the AIS, ∆t = RI and
the chain length, N = (RR ∗ 60) + 6, where 126 ≤ N ≤ 1, 806, meaning that key chains
are recomputed at most once per hour. Since the RI is a function of a vessel’s navigation
status, speed, and course rate-of-change and static information is sent every 6 minutes (see
Ref. [1]), ∆t can be implied by the receiver without the need to formally exchange this data.
In addition, since AIS messages do not include a time stamp (aside from UTC seconds in
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Fig. 23: AIS with Authentication using TESLA keys embedded in existing position reports.
Type 1-3), this must be included in order for the receiver to determine if a message has
arrived within the correct ∆t. The current date is also included as part of the MAC to
create a unique message and prevent replay attacks. Another important point is that when
the receiver validates the MAC, they are also confirming the integrity of the message.
We also use PKI digital signatures to provide authentication of one element of the key
chain which allows the receiver to confirm the identity of the sender. To do this, we use
the sender’s private key (signed by a CA and known only to them), S−(·), to digitally sign
the initial MAC containing K0 in M0. Upon receipt of this message and the subsequent key
disclosure of K0 in M1, the receiver can use the sender’s public key, S+(·), to authenticate
the sender. Additionally, since all previously sent keys can be computed from any one key, a
receiver who misses this initial broadcast containing the digital signature can simply request
a digitally signed key chain commitment from the sender and could authenticate all past
messages they have received from the sender, as long as all MACs were validated and arrived
within the proper time constraints.
Finally, although this protocol only addresses automatic position reports, the concept
can easily be expanded to include additional vessel types. Static AIS data (Message Type
5) which is transmitted every 6 minutes, could easily be included in this framework by
embedding a MAC onto the message and subsequently disclosing the key in a follow-on
position report, thus linking that report to the hash chain. Message Type 5 can also be
used to provide authentication for those vessels that were not in range for a sender’s initial
digitally signed broadcast position report. This means that Message Type 5 would provide
a periodic broadcast of a vessel’s digital signature and would allow frequent authentication
by new users who enter the link. A representation of how this would work within the AIS
architecture is shown in Fig. 23.
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5.4 SIMULATIONS
The proposed authentication protocol for the AIS was tested using Python 3 as a software
front-end, which was paired with GNU Radio for controlling SDR implementations of the
AIS transmitter and receiver. The pseudocode for the Python front-end includes the start
up information for a user, the broadcast message creation, and the actions taken by the
receiver to validate the contents of a message.
Algorithm 1 – AIS Transmitter: Authentication Startup
1: Input data:
 V : Random value to begin hash chain seed
 N : Value to represent length of hash chain, N = (RR ∗ 60) + 6
 T0: Time stamp for initial message
 A: AIS Message Data
 H: Hash function
2: Create blank list, L, of size N + 1
3: Set V as first item in L
4: for Each value in L do
5: Compute the hash of the previous value in L
6: Store keys for release in reverse order of creation, K0...Kn+1
7: end for
8: Compute digital signature of first MAC, S−[MAC(K0, A,Date)]
The AIS transmitter and receiver were implemented using a USRP B200 SDR and an
RTL-SDR, respectively, and the packet structure was modified to incorporate the authenti-
cation information as shown in Fig. 24.
Specifically, Fig. 24(a) illustrates the modifications required on the AIS packet structure
for an initial broadcast upon powering up an AIS receiver or after the user has exhausted
all keys within its key chain and/or needs to re-establish its settings such as reporting rate
change. Although the data portion of this message is approximately double the size of a
traditional AIS frame, the total message size is only 439 bits and would only need to be
broadcast six times per hour. Additionally, this message can be sent within 2 consecutive
time slots, which is less than the maximum of 5 consecutive slots listed in the ITU standard.
61
Algorithm 2 – AIS Transmitter: Broadcasting Authentication Information
1: Input data:
 MAC(Ki, A,Date)
 Ti = Message Timestamp
2: if Message is ITDMA then
3: Insert S−[MAC(K0, A,Date)],MAC(K0, A,Date), T0 into ITDMA formatted AIS
packet
4: else
5: Insert MAC(Ki, A,Date), Ki−1, Ti into SOTDMA formatted AIS packet
6: end if
7: Broadcast to all stations
(a) Updated Packet Structure of Initial Key Disclosure Broadcast Message.
(b) Updated Packet Structure of Subsequent Delayed Key Disclosure Broadcast Message.
Fig. 24: The structure of AIS packets implementing the proposed authentication protocol.
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Algorithm 3 – AIS Receiver: Authentication Verification
1: Input data:
 S−[MAC(K0, A,Date)] (if ITDMA)
 MAC(K0, A,Date)
 Ki−1, Buffered Key
 Ti−1, Time stamp of sent message
 RI, Sender Reporting Interval (derived from sender status/speed/course rate-of-
change)
 MessageType, AIS Message Type 1-27 (legacy) or 28+ (AIS Authenticated Mes-
sage)
2: if Message Type ≥ 28 then
3: if Message is ITDMA then
4: Use sender’s public key to validate digital signature and store,
S+[[S−[MAC(K0, A,Date)]]
5: Store MAC(K0, A,Date)
6: else
7: if Ti−1 > (RI + .1 ∗NI ∗ .02667) then
8: USER IS UNKNOWN (Message arrived outside time interval)
9: else
10: Compute H(Ki−1, Ai−1, Date), compare to stored MAC
11: if Stored MAC and computed MAC are equivalent and Valid Digital Signature
on file for this hash chain then
12: USER IS TRUSTED AND VERIFIED
13: else
14: if Stored MAC and computed MAC are equivalent but no valid Digital Signa-
ture on file then






21: USER IS UNKNOWN
22: end if
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TABLE 1: Comparison of AIS Security Protocols
Method Data Overhead (bits) Consecutive TDMA Frames Cryptography Security Type
Proposed Authentication Protocol
(using TESLA)
203 (initial & digitally signed)
171 subsequent
1.5-2 Asymmetric ECDSA (NIST-192)
Secure AIS w/ IDBE [30]
331, 672, or 768
(depending on security type)
3+ Asymmetric SS, MNT
SecureAIS – Securing Pairwise
Vessel Communications [28]
Not stated; 880 (estimated) 10 (5 per transceiver) Symmetric ECQV/ECDH
pAIS
(Suggested in [33])
258 2 Asymmetric RSA
X.509 Certificates
(Suggested in [25], [28])
8000+ (estimated) 85 Asymmetric X.509
A BLAKE2 hash function was used in the implementation of the TESLA-based authentica-
tion protocol, which corresponds to a lightweight hash algorithm that provides more efficient
and secure hash generation than SHA-3 and RSA [50]. 80-bit hash values were used as this
will provide more than adequate security in the extremely short duration (between 2 and
30 s) during which each chain will be active. The size of each value in the hash chain may
be reduced pending further analysis.
Fig. 24(b) shows the structure of subsequent frames that are sent out by a user after
their initial key disclosure broadcast. These messages do not require the 192 bit overhead of
a digital signature and instead only need to include the MAC, key disclosure of the previous
frame, and time stamp. This message is a total of 411 bits and can be sent out in 1.5 frames.
Finally, Table 1 shows a comparison of our results with those developed in other works.
[29] provided no packet or security analysis, while authors in [25] only suggested a X.509
certificate based system, which is compared using data derived from [28].
To compare the efficiency of the proposed authentication approach I looked at the ad-
ditional overhead required for implementation and compared it to that of the alternative
approaches in [25, 30, 28, 29, 33]. The comparison is summarized in Table 1. The proposed
authentication approach using TESLA requires 76.9% − 80% less data overhead and 80%
less consecutive TDMA frames than that in [28]. Relative to [30], the proposed approach
requires 38.7% less overhead data for the initial digitally signed message and 48.3% less data
for all subsequent messages. Furthermore, the proposed approach uses 1 less TDMA frame
as the digital signature is only required to be sent once per hash chain (every hour), which
implies that sending 120 messages in an hour would require 48.25% less overhead than [30].
However, even sending out a digital signature every 6 minutes alongside static information
in Message Type 5 would result in an additional 1218 bits per hour of data, yet it would
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still require 42.2% less overhead than [30]. This also provides 25.9% less overhead per hour
than pAIS in [33]. The most powerful ideas here are the fact that frequent messages can be
sent out without the need to include a digital signature on every one, and there is no need
to conduct an initial symmetric key exchange for use in the MAC which frees up slots in
the TDMA scheme. This method provides an optimal balance between sending a lengthy
digital signature on every message while still allowing new vessels to verify a user’s identity
even if they were not present during the initial signature broadcast. Coupled with the loss
tolerance of the TESLA key derivation process, this system allows for a robust broadcast
protocol ideally suited for enhancing the security of the AIS system.
5.5 INTERFACE WITH EXISTING NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
Since TESLA AIS Authentication can be implemented as a software-only update to han-
dle new AIS messages, vessels would only need to include an additional software package
to help handle the arrival of updated packets. Specifically, the existing AIS software would
handle physical layer data conversion (GMSK demodulation and NRZI decoding) and then
the TESLA software would handle link layer functions if new packet types were detected. If
old packet types were detected (indicating a user has not yet updated to TESLA authenti-
cation), the existing AIS software would function as it normally does, essentially bypassing
the TESLA protocols. The only TESLA interaction would be updating a vessel’s authen-
tication status on the chart plotter/RADAR as “unknown”. As shown earlier in Fig. 19,
the authentication protocol will output a notification to the user’s chart plotter and radar
indicating the trust level of the data, similar to the way one can currently query an AIS
target to review its voyage and other static data. Data output from TESLA must adhere





In this paper I have conducted an extensive review of the AIS system, which I have
shown contains significant vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited by an adversary. I
provided an extensive review of the existing research on AIS security solutions and explored
security research in similar fields including the aviation and ah-hoc vehicular network fields.
After careful consideration, I determined that AIS requires both authentication and mes-
sage integrity and built upon work first theorized in the aviation industry to use TESLA as
a broadcast authentication protocol. After this research, I presented my first contribution
which is a SDR AIS transmitter and receiver that can be used as a robust test platform for
AIS research. Next, I presented my second contribution which was a novel authentication
algorithm for the AIS system based on the TESLA protocol that enables receivers of mul-
ticast communications to verify the source and integrity of received data packets. Unlike
the alternative approaches proposed for authentication in the AIS, the approach presented
in this paper can authenticate users without the use of an a priori shared secret key or the
need to conduct key exchanges over several messages. This solution requires significantly
less overhead than previous solutions and is backward compatible with existing hardware.
Additionally, this solution contains an integrated message time stamp that prevents the
possibility of a replay attack.
6.1 FUTURE WORK
Future work will include testing data usage of this system when used in conjunction
with existing AIS transceivers as well as analyzing the scaling of this system and modeling
how it will react in congested waterways where many users are active. Additionally, the
inclusion of the PKI signature on the hash chain is cumbersome and requires world-wide
agreement on an established CA and private key exchanges. However, there must be a way
to initially validate the identity of a user producing a hash chain, so this element of the
protocol cannot be ignored. Therefore, more research should be conducted to provide a
decentralized and lightweight method to deal with this issue. Potential solutions include
using blockchain technology to share keys, or by implementing a certificate-less web-of-trust
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element in place of a traditional digital signature. Another feature worth exploring is how
small you can make the key size while still maintaining adequate security of the hash chain,
given that the proposed disclosure rate is on the order of seconds. Finally, work must also be
done to ensure the output of this system is seamlessly displayed on maritime chart plotters
and radar systems since the data this feature provides is ultimately a tool for the use of
shipboard personnel in evaluating safety of navigation decisions.
The proposed authentication scheme does not solve all of the vulnerabilities within the
AIS system. As long as the information on an AIS transceiver is configurable by the
user, there remains the possibility that PKI and hash chain verified data is still inaccu-
rate. Mariners operating vessels receive extensive training and are required by international
law to use all of their available tools to determine risk of collision with another vessel, so
AIS is not their sole source of information. Additionally, this authentication protocol inher-
ently relies upon an accurate and available GPS source for both timing and position data.
As pointed out in [51], GPS jamming and spoofing are relatively easy, so this represents
a vulnerability within the protocol. This is especially true if using rapid reporting rates
where time only needs to be shifted slightly so that a user is unaware, eventually leading to
lost positional data due to the TESLA system invalidating packets wthat arrived after the
set key disclosure schedule (or shifting time altogether to the advantage of an adversary).
The vulnerabilities with AIS message 21 (ATON Report) and message 22/23 (group assign-
ment command) must also include verification that they originated only from a competent
maritime authority such as the U.S. Coast Guard, not just any valid public key within the
system. This can be done through the TESLA authentication protocol but would need to
include additional software which would specifically check for these message types and verify
that a specific key derived from a maritime authority exists. This additional hierarchical
PKI can still originate from the ITU but should be separate from the one used to generate
normal key pairs and should only be distributed to the agencies in each country responsible
for ATON and AIS. This authentication protocol also relies on the ability of each vessel to
securely retrieve their own private key from a CA and also to keep that private key secret.
Since this protocol was not implemented using IBE, vessel’s must also be able to retrieve
the public key of any vessel they interact with on the ocean. This is a simple task with the
internet, where a public database can be generated that allows vessels to search for public
keys based on any vessel’s unique MMSI number. The CA and intermediate authorities
would be responsible for ensuring that the MMSI is bound to the correct public key. While
larger vessels operating far from shore can use onboard internet capabilities to connect to
67
this database, there is still a problem for smaller vessels. Recreational vessels and other
small craft often do not have these capabilities and would therefore need to download the
latest copy of the public key database before departing or connect using a cellular connec-
tion, although this is unreliable off shore. An IBE scheme for public key retrieval may be
one way to alleviate this problem since a vessel’s public key would be tied to their static
AIS data, although this would require additional message overhead as shown in [30] and
[43]. These proposed areas of research will ultimately lead to a more secure AIS system
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hss = dsp.SpectrumAnalyzer('SampleRate', Fs);
data = randi([0 1],3000,1);%I had to increase the # of points
%% OQPSK Modulate data
hMod = comm.OQPSKModulator('BitInput',true);
OQPSK = step(hMod, data);
hMod2 = comm.GMSKModulator('BitInput',true, 'BandwidthTimeProduct', .5);
GMSK=step(hMod2,data);
hMod3 = comm.QPSKModulator('BitInput',true);
QPSK = step(hMod3, data);




% %% Add noise
% %hAWGN = comm.AWGNChannel('EbNo',2);
% rx = step(hMod, tx);
%























%title('Phase Comparison of MSK and GMSK')
xlabel('Sample')
ylabel('Phase (rad)')
[pxx, w1] = pwelch(OQPSK);
[pxy, w2] = pwelch(GMSK);
[pyy, w3] = pwelch(QPSK);









ylabel('Power Spectral Density (dB/(rad/sample))');
xlabel('Normalized Frequency');
legend('OQPSK', 'GMSK', 'QPSK', 'MSK');
%title('Power Spectral Density of Modulation Schemes');
figure(2)
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Gmod1 = comm.GMSKModulator('BitInput',true, 'BandwidthTimeProduct', .1);
Gmod2 = comm.GMSKModulator('BitInput',true, 'BandwidthTimeProduct', .2);
Gmod3 = comm.GMSKModulator('BitInput',true, 'BandwidthTimeProduct', .3);
Gmod4 = comm.GMSKModulator('BitInput',true, 'BandwidthTimeProduct', .4);
Gmod5 = comm.GMSKModulator('BitInput',true, 'BandwidthTimeProduct', .5);







[px1, x1] = pwelch(GMSK1);
[px2, x2] = pwelch(GMSK2);
[px3, x3] = pwelch(GMSK3);
[px4, x4] = pwelch(GMSK4);
[px5, x5] = pwelch(GMSK5);












legend('.1', '.2','.3', '.4', '.5', '1');
ylabel('Power Spectral Density (dB/(rad/sample))');
xlabel('Normalized Frequency');
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